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ABSTRACT
The central problem
	
e thesis is to investigate
the international legal validity of the
Canadian claim to the
Arctic Archipelago . In order
consider the bearing onn the
problem of th ctor principl
the area investigated
comprised the island
the 60th 141 meridians of west longitude extended'
to the
North Pol which meridians are northerly projections of Canada's
easternmost and westernmost boundaries .
After a brief review of the facts and law surrounding
the transfer of British Arctic possessions
to Canada in 1870 and
18$0, the international law applicable to archipelagic.. formations
and to the acquisition of title to terrae nullius
was examined .
There followed, in the perspective of international law
and the
historical precedents, an examination of the Canadian claims t
( ) .the islands
of the Arctic Archipelago, and (b) the adjacent
. waters, especially
the aftermath of the two voyages of the
Manhattan' and the Canadian legislation of
June, 1970, extending
territorial waters to a breadth of twelve miles
and creating a
large anti-pollution zone .
It was concluded that Canadaes claim to the
islands was
very strong either under the "prescription" or
the "consolidation"
doctrines, especially in the absence of serious adverse claims,
and
in the light of a
vigorous Canadian manifestation of animus occupandi
for several decades, at least .
Although the validity of the recent Canadian Maritime
claims had been questioned by the United States, it was suggested
either on the basis of the "consolidation" doctrine
or in view of
the evolving, norms of the international law of the sea that here
also Canada could make out a strong case in
support of the legis-
lation . of June, 1970.
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When dealing with a subject as swiftly developing and as
topical Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, t e writer is
continually anger of being overtaken by events . As recently
1963 one learned author suggested, with no
disclaimers, that
t e leg tatus of Canadian Arctic waters wa
relyacademic
was little prospect that the Northwest Passage
would ever become an international ocean, thoroughfare . The 1969
and 1970 Arctic voyages of the S .S . Manhattan have transformed
what was once a remote contingency into a probability . And this
probability, : of course, along with its anticipated consequences,
has confronted the Canadian government with legal and political
problems of considerable magnitude .
In addition
legal status archipelagic waters, the government was faced
with the associated problems of devising measures to regulate
use of the Northwest Passage by vessels ofmaritime nations in
the interests of safe navigation and to prevent oil pollution,
The decade of the Sixties was a period in which a series of disastrous
pil spillages dramatized the woeful ecological consequences of
pollution of the seas . The pollution problem became especially acute
with the development of large fleets of supertankers after 1967
.' An
additional disturbing element of this problem was the largely unknown
effects of pollution in frigid northern
waters .
If the legal status of Arctic waters was conjectural,,
the
Canadian title to the islands north-of-the mainland
also required
examination. As the following pages attempt to show, Canadian
sovereignty over the archipelagic-islands has not been as uncontested
by
. other states, nor as clear from the legal point of view, is
sometimes contended. Some of the main legal problems in this regard
have been isolated and an attempt has been made to evaluate the
Canadian claims,
surveying the law applyi g to Canada's terrestrial
and marine claims in the Arct
	
it was essential to consider
various international law precedents affecting analogous claims
by other states in the past. An attempt was made to apply the
governing principles extracted from these precedents
to the
specific Canadian problems . There is, course some room for
disagreement he as there is in the case of most legal
controversies, butat least a conscientious effort has been
made to po e t e issues honestly and to answer them as frankly
as possible .
CHAPTER ONE
CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ARCTIC ARCHIPELAGO
The concept
	
sovereignty international een
developed from numerous
accordingly, of p ramoun importance in any investigation of
a specific territoria claim to define initially the precise area
in question. For the purpose of this enquiry, the dimensions of
the "Arctic Archipelago will be understood to comprise all those
islands and waters, along with the contiguous permanent ice,
situated between th 60th and 141st parallels of west longitude
as, they converge towards the Pole . Like all definitions, this
one contains an element of arbitrariness and is broader than a
purely geographical
: definition would be .
as indicating the maximum boundaries of Arctic territory which
have been claimed by Canada under the "sector principle .
will be necessary to investigate, as the enquiry proceeds,
whether distinctions should be made between the jurisdiction or
powers exercisable by Canada and other states in various areas
included within the Archipelago as so defined .
Within the physical dimensions referred to above, e
object of the present enquiry is to ascertain whetherCanada
exercises sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago . Violent
controversies have agitated philospphers concerning the term
"sovereignty
." not proposed to enter into polemics or
bstruse metaphysical debate, but it is nonetheless necessary to
adopt a working definition of the term "sovereignty The trend
erritorial claims in disputed areas . It
For a discussion the "sector principle"
vide infra, 31 f
useful, however
longer, intelligible when used
is used to connote
questionable w ether any nation
foreign policy will be circumscribed by one's anticipations
absolute sense
. ; If
ndependence
	
of merely in
e world today
that sense . The range of choice
others, even if one is a superpower .
addition, sovereignty may be conditioned by self-imposed norms
undertakings adopted, for instance, by signatories to the United
Nations Charter or to other treaties . For present purposes, and
having regard to the preceding considerations, one may understand
the term sovereignty as the exclusive competence vis-a-vis the
rest of the world to govern in a defined area
. The central
problem of the present investigation is to, determine what compet
ences Canada exercises over the Arctic Archipelago, both over the
islands and the adjacent waters and ice, whether, n accordance
with' the above understanding of the term sovereignty", such
cornpetences are exercised to the exclusion of other powers .
The enquiry will begin with a brief survey of the arch-
ipelagic islands . In subsequent chapters there will discussed :
(a) the relevant international law applicable to territorial claims,
especiallyy as it relates. to
archipelagoes and polar areas
; (b) the
issue of Canadian sovereignty-over- the Arctic islands
; ( ) the issue
of Canadian, sovereignty over archipelagic water and ice, and (d)
an evaluation of Canadian, claims to the Archipelago and present
government policy_.
The principal islands of the Arctic Archipelago are listed,
in Table A . There are, of course, hundredsof smaller islands through-
out the Arctic which have not been included . Because of the somewhat
arbitrary definition framed for th Archipelago above, it should be
formulating
Cf . "political sovereignty",, defined. in
Schwarzenberger,
A Manual of International-Law, 4th ed ., London, 1960,
vol . 2, 691 .
izabeth Islands
Area
Northern Islands (Queen E
TABLE A
Principal Islands of th Arctic Archepiago
Ellesmere
	
. • Y . 82,119 s uare miles
Devon 20,861
Melville	 16,369
Axel Heiber . 15,779
Bathurst . . . 7,609,
Prince Patrick . 6,081 ;
Ellef Ringnes	 5,139
Cornwallis 2
$
609
Amund Ringnes , 2,515
Mackenzie King , . . . . 1,922 ;
Borden	 1,344
Cornwall 1,292
Eglinton 551
King Christian 448
Lougheed . 413
Brock . 396
Camero . . . . 396-
By am Martin . . . 376
Meighen	 293
Graham 293
North Kent 258
Emerald . 251
Cobourg . . • . . . 141
Little Cornwallis	 139,
Baillie Hamilton 114
Southern Region :
Baffin	 183,810
Victoria . . . . 81,930
Banks 23,230
Prince of Wales . . . . 12,830
Somerset . . 9,370
King William . 4,955
Bylot . . 4,200
Prince Charles 3,639
Stefansson . . 2,890
Air Force . 596
Wales . . . 439
. .
.
. .
0 . . . 0
. . .
43 r,
386
349
330
301
281
261
183
173
173
173
170
167
Rowley .
Vansittart . .
Russell ,	
Jens Munk
White
Bray
Foley	
Koch -
hiatty . . . .
Royal Geographical Society .
Jenny Lind . .
Crown- Prince Frederick .
Prescott
mentioned that according some classification only the islands
lying directly to the south of Parry Channel are actually charact-
erized as
	
Canadian Arctic Archipelago" .-
The 1 pest islands of Canada are in the
North and all experience an Arctic climate . The
northern group extends from the islands in James
Bay to Ellesmere Island which reaches 83 07 N .
Those in the District of Franklin lie north of the
mainland of Canada and are generally referred to
as the Canadian Arctic Archipelago ; those in-the
extreme north --- lying north of M'Clure Strait ---
Viscount Melville Sound --- Barrow Strait --- Lancaster
Sound w passage are known as the een Elizabeth
Islands
o
Despite the coveni-nee for some purposes dual classification
f the . islands, it has been thought pre rab' to treat them as
a single archipelagic unit because of their configuration considered
as a whole,_ and their many shared geological, cographical and
historical associations .
Because of their remoteness from ttled areas, the
sparsity of their population and the exploration of the Arctic by
several nations, doubts have been expressed-in the past concerning
the validity of Canadian title to the islands . In 1905 Dr, W.F.
King, Chief Astronomer of Canada, prepared a thorough confidential
report for the Department of the Interior on Canadian Sovereignty
over the Arctic . That portion of his concluding observations
See The Canada Year Book s 1969 (Dominion Bureau
of Statistics) Ottawa, 1969, 10-11, (hereinafter
cited as C.Y .B., 1.969) and vide infra, fn. 15 at
29 for Pharandts employment ofsuch a dual frame
f reference for the Arctic islands in connection
with the delimitation of archipelagic waters .
C .Y.B 969 .
Canad
	
title to the northern islands
is derived from Great Britain's . Great
Britain's title rests upon'acts'of discovery
and possession . These acts were never, prior
to the transfer to Canada, ratified by state
authority, or confirmed by the exercise of
jurisdiction &c . Canada's assumption of,
authority in 11895 may not have full internat-
ional rce .
The conclusion from the foregoing seems
to be that Canada's title to some at least of
thee northern islands is imperfect„ It may best
be perfected by exercise of jurisdiction where
any settlements
exist.-j/
Since, h few exceptions, the islands of the Arctic were un-
inhabited or only seasonally inhabited by nomadic Eskimo bands,
Dr . King's conclusion' that a<manifestation of Canadian authority
would be necessary to perfect sovereignty over the Archipelago
would scarcely be reassuring, to the Canadian government . As . he
says, however, the Canadian title is derived from that of Great
Britain. At the date of transfer, whatever it was, Canada could
obtain no better title than Britain possessed : nemo .dat quod non
habet . As a preliminary step towards evaluating the worth of
Canada's claim as successor in title_ to Britain accordingly, the
relevant transactions by which Canada acquired a claim' to the
Archipelago should first be surveyed .
The conveyance of the Arctic islands to Canada was
effected by two Imperial Orders-in-Council dated, respectively,
1870 and 1880 . In the first, dated July 23rd, 1870, there was
a purported conveyance to Canada of Rupert's Landd and the .North-
West Territories, but not precise geographical co-ordinates of
either of these regions was given.
5/ King, Report Upon the Title of Canada to
the Islands North of the Mainland of Canada,
Ottawa, 1905, 7, (hereinafter cited as King) .
As Dr . King observes,
	
descriptions of indicated territories :
The Order=
Counci 7 derived its authority from the Rupert's Land Act
8/
and
the s id Act recites in its preamble, from
.seems never to have been determined on authority"
ultimately,
North America-Act .-
Under the terms of the first Order-in-Council, Canada
received h territorial rights previously vested in the Hudson
Bay Company by virtue of the Royal Charter of May 2nd 1670 ;
preliminary consideration, therefore, would be the extent of the
Company's proprietary holdings . By the terms of the Charter, the
territory granted was deemed to be "one of, our plantations or colonies
in America", and received the appellation "Rupert's Land" . Subject
to the payment of a nominal rent and the pledging of fealty to the
See "Her Majesty's Order in Council Admitting
Rupert's Land and the North-west Territory into
the Union", in British NorthAmericaActsand
Selected Statutes,' 1867=1948,-Ottawa, 1948, 133-137 .
Section 5, Rupert's Land Act, 31-32 Vict ., c .105 (Imp .) .
Cf . Article 146 of the B.N .A . Act which reads :
146 It shall be lawful for the Queen by and
with the advice of Her Majesty's Most Honourable,
Privy Council, . on Addresses from the Houses of
Parliament of Canada, and, from the Houses of the
respective Legislatures of the Colonoies or Prov-
inces;of Newfoundland, Price Edward Island, and
British Columbia, to admit those Colonies or Prov- -
inces 'or any of them, into the Union, and on
Address from the Houses of Parliament of-Canada'
to admit Rupert's Land and the North.-western
Territory, oreither oE_them, into the Union, on
such Terms and Conditions- in each case as are in
the Addresses expressed and as' the Queen thinks'
fit to approve, subject to the provisions_of this
Act, and the Provisions of any Order-in-Council
in that behalf shall have effect as if they had
been enacted by the Parliament of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
Sovereign, the Charter constituted the Hudson's Bay Company and
its successors as the " . . .true and absolute lords and proprietors"
of the territory conveyed . A duly-appointed Governor and
of the Company was vested with legislative powers, and could
laws and impose penalties within domains so long as they were
not contrary or repugnant to the laws of England . For these purposes
certain designated officials of the Company were empowered to judge
Company employees or residents of its territories in both civil and
criminal cases, with mentioned exceptions where accused were to be
sent to England for trial
10/
It will be appreciated from the foregoing that within the
area of its activities tie Hudson's Bay Company had many of the
,attributes and exercised many of the prerogatives of a sovereign state .
Within its vast territories, it was the provider of sustenance and
the arbiter of justice for a heterogeneous population of natives,
Company employees and transients . The Company lacked the powers
of legation and treaty-making characteristic of truly-sovereign
entities but vis-a-vis the inhabitants of its extensive domains it
possessed most of the powers wielded by sovereign states . Since
the 1870 Order-in-Council embraced Rupert's Land, it is most important
to determine what were the areas under the Company's control .
Unfortunately, the description in the Company's Charter is ambiguous .
10/ See' Read, (1937) 10 Man . Bar News 451 ; and
Charters,Statutes . Orders in Council etc .,
Relatingtothe Hudson's BayCompany, London, 1931,
passim.
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According
	
the Charte
acquire :
a seas, strai a s, rivers, lakes, creeks
and sounds, in whatsoever titucl:: they shall be, that
lie within the entrance of the straits commonly called
Hudson's Straits, together with all the lands, countries
and territories upon the coasts of the seas,'straitt`_s,
nays, lakes, rivers, creeks and sounds aforesaid
;, which
are not now actually possessed by any of, our subjects
or by the subjects of any other ; Christian Prince or
State .
11 /
As Dr . Kin- mentions, the above description has been variously
interpreted . common construction of the grant, at least since
the mid-nineteenth century is that its territory comprised the
watershed
all waters flowing into Hudson's Bay i On the
basis of such a construction "Rupert' Landoll
or the region under
the Company's patent, would extend from tTngava Bay and Central
ebec on the East to the 't<ocky Mountain Divide on the West and
from Southern Baffin Island and the Keewatin "Barrens" in the
North to the American Boundary and Central Ontario
. I 3/ This h e
area, radiating 11 directions from Hudson Bay,, was ruled
virtually as a fie Company for the two centuries following
1670 .
1868, the erial Parliament passed the .Rupert's Land
14/ which contained a recital
of the Company's
Charter and
revoked most of the quasi political and proprietary rights formerly
exercised by the Company . The properietary rights were expressly
revested he British Crown . The Company was left, however, with
the right to carry trade and commerce within the area of Rupert's
1
d in King
Ibid ., loc .cit .
1.3/ See map facing 7 after C.Y .B., 1969', 9 t
1.4/ 31-32 Vict., 05 (Imp .) .
/
t
Company A venturcrs was
L revestin
	
Crown of the rights of a predominantly
political or administrative character was accomplished for the
purpose of transferring political powers d er the region to Canada .
Accordingly, in 1869, the Canadian government made temporary prov-
ision fo the administration of Ruperrt's Land, l land in the following
year the Order-in-Council referred to was passed by Brit in to
dmit Rupert's Land and the North-western territories to Canada
pursuant t the Rn.ipert' Lend Act.
A defect in descriptionof Rupert's Land in the
Charter of 1670 was that it was fundamentally a geographical rather
than a political one . There were no demarcated boundaries . I
the context of such a vast claim, there was room
with other states on the location of common frontiers. 'This .was
especially the case, of course the more northern and un-
settled areas . If one applies purely geographical criteria
.,
probably the only part of the Arctic Archipelago that would be in-
cluded :in Rupert's Land would be southern Baffin Island.! What of
the . remainder of the Archipelag The description of the Ndorth-
western Territories, which presumably would comprise much of the
15/ Section 4 of the Rupert's Land Act reads :
"Upon the acceptance by Her Majestyof such surrender
of Rights of Government and Proprietary Rights, and
all other privileges, liberties, franchises,' powers
and authorities whatsoever. . .and which shall have
been so surrendered, shall be absolutely extinguished ;
provided that nothing herein contained shall prevent
the said Governor and Company from continuing to carry
on in Rupert's Land or elsewhere Trade and Commerce ."
I The Northwest Territories Act, 32-33 Vict ., c.3 .
Prime Minister Sir_-John A . Macdonald had made' use of
the occasion to appoint a troublesome cabinet colleague
to administer the territory, Creighton, John A.Macdonald,
The Old . Chieftain, Toronto, 1955, 35-37 ..
-Council
	
ted July 31st, 1880?- w s as ambiguous as the
instrument it purported to amend and amplify . In, extremely
general terms
2 /
the 1880 instrument sought to convey to Canada
I British territories and
already included Dominion of Canada and all islands adjacent
to such territories or ossessions excepting only Newfoundland
and its dependencies:- Since what was precisely in question was
whether the islands the Arctic Archipelago were in fact British
10 -
possessions in North_ America not
The Order-in-Council of 1880 eads as follows :
At the Court Osborne House, Isle of Wight the 31st
day of July, 1880
Present :
The Queen's Most Excellent
Lord President,
Lord Steward,
Lord Chamberlain„
Whereas it is expedient that all British Territori
and Possessions in North America and the islands adjacent
to such territories and possessions which are not already
included in the Dominion of Canadaa should (with the
exception of the Colony of Newfoundland and its depend-
encies) be annexed to and form part of the said Dominion
And Whereas the Senate and Commons of Canada in Parl-
iament assembled by an address dated the 3rd day of May,
1878, represented to Her Majesty
"That it is desirable that the Parliament of Canada on
the transfer of the before mentioned Territories being
completed should have authority to legislate for their future
welfare and good government and the power to. make all .need-
ful rules and regulations respecting them, the same as in
the case of the other Territories, and that the Parliament
f Canada expressed its willingness to assume the duties
and obligations consequent thereon ."
And whereas Her Majesty is graciously please to accede
the desire expressed in the said Address :-
Now therefore it is hereby ordered and declared by ri r
Majesty by and kith the advice of the Privy: Council as
follows .
From and after the first day of September, 1880, all
British Territories and Possessions in North America not
Majesty,
possessions, a naked conveyance of "Br
	
h territories and possessions
in North America without the requested comprehensive description
of the Arctic islands was of little value . What was, , needed was
confirmation that all or certain of the archipelagic islands were
claimed by the British Crown and were being transferred to Canada .
The reasons for the vagueness of h description the
1880 order-in--Council appears in a letter sent by the British Admiralty
to the Under Secretary of State for Colonies early in 1879
letter transmits a report by F.J. Evans,, .Admiralty Plydrographer, and
comments on the appropriateness of the proposed description for the
delimitation of Canada northern boundaries contained the
parliamentarya4dress of 1878 . The comments of the Admiralty disclose
considerable doubt concerning the exact extent of British possessions
in the Arctic :
Remarking that object of this Bill appears to
to define the limits of British North America, I would
observe that prior to 1852, the northern limits of the
Polar lands--- West of Greenland.-- as discovered by
British Navigators, did not extend north of the entrance
of Smith Sound, From this position, Captain Inglefield
already included within the Dominion of Canada
and all islands adjacent to such Territories or
Possessions shall (with the exception of the Colony
of Newfoundland and its dependencies) become and
beannexed to and form part of the said Dominion
of Canada; and become and be subject to the Taws
for the time being in force in the said Dominion
in so far as such laws may be applicable thereto .
C .L. Peel .
See letter dated 28 January, 1879, C .O. ,
Vol . 759, in "Arctic Islands Documents, 1873-1880"
file, DepartmentoftheInterior, R.G._15, A-2,
Vol 5-6 Public Archives; of Canada, Ottawa, (herein-
after cited P .A .C .) .
The
of the Royal Navy saw land to the North extending beyond the
79th parallel of Latitude . In 1853-5 ; again in 1860-1 ; and
in 1873-3 ; American officers explored this region to beyond
the 82nd parallel ; Kennedy Channel (now named in the
proposed Bill.) being the boundary between the lands so
explored on the West, and of Greenland on the East ; to
the former they gave the name of Grinnel Land . Our own
Arctic expedition of 1875-6 pushed northward
	
the coas s
explored by the Americans .
In view these discoveries by American citizens,
is a matter -or consideration whether the,_proposed
boundaries should include the words "Kennedy Channel
and all the islands in and adjacent thereto" . But as
embracing, as would appear undoubted, British discoveries ;
the Eastern boundary might be defined as extending to
Smith Sound as far north only as the 8 parallel of Latitude.
This, however, subject to the rights - this country established
by the discovery of more northern lands made in the late Arctic
expedition. 23
As a result of the above-mentioned letter, the highly specific Canadian
drafted terms of conveyance the Arctic islands were ejected, and
there were substituted therefor the much more general and nebulous
terms referred to above .
24/
In addition, it was decided not to effect
the grant by Act of the Imperial Parliame but rather by an
Imperial Order- n-Council .
The legal validity of conveying the Arctic islands by Order-
Councii instead of by parliamentary enactment has been doubted /
Those who question legality emphasize that under Article 146
the B .N .A . Act26/ only certain specifically mentioned Province
2 / Ibid ., C .O. 42, Vol . eater dated 23 January, 1879
See Map Tabl
24/ Vide supra, 3 .
25/ Cf . King,
26/ Vide supr
colonies and territories could be admitted
in-Council . Assuming
of the
	
did not 1880 form part Rupert or the North-
western Territory, nd that the enumeration of Territories trans-
ferrable by Order- ouncil Article 146 was exhaustive there
would be no constitutional authorization for a transfer by imperial
Order-in-Council . To adopy a contrary' view would imply, for exampl
that the executive could, without parliamentary sanction aliena e
virtually any British possession. Notwithstanding the above consider-
ations, when confronted with the problem the law officers of the
Crown considered that valid title could thereby transferred .
Doubts lingered nonetheless, about the regularity of the
transfer, 1895, ex abundanti cautel imperial legislation
was passed which provided that " . . .where t boundaries of a colony
have, either before or after the passing this Act, been a tered
etters
of the
by her Majesty t
so altered shall be and
Queen in Council, or letters patent, the
deemed to have been from the date
t the Arctic islands
alteration the boundaries of the colony .
constituted retrospective parliamentary authorization for the grant
the Order- -Council of 1880, hether or not the Order had been
validly passed . Henceforward, Canada could claim both executive
and legislative sanction for the conveyance stands, but the
continuing absence of a definite description of the islands was
bound to create doubts concerning the precise dimensions of Canadian
sovereignty he Arctic . Canada ha however, construed the Order
2 / See letter dated 3 April, 1879, Adm. 1330-79
Canada) Arctic Islands Documents file supra
the ominion by Order-
or at least certain
legislation
ouncil of 1880 as
	
initive grant Arctic Archipelago,
controversies with other states,
30/
there Ilaand despite occasions
never been a serious or protracted challenge the Canadian claim
by any member of the international community .
Canadian concern about northern sove iignty persisted,
however, 1919 a somewhat trifling international incident
caused a reconsideration of the whole problem by government circles
in Ottawa. In 1919 Greenlanders crossed over the frozen ice to
Ellesmere island to kill muskoxen. When Canada protested to
Copenhagen the diplomatic note of July 31st, 1919, contending
that the foreign skimos were not observing local game .lawsi no
satisfactory reply was received from the Danish government .
29/ See chapter three, infra, and C .Y.B
30/ Vide infra, chapter three, passim.
31/ Vide infra, 60-62 .
0
the unofficial level, ndeed, the explorer Knud Rasmussen .argued
on behalf of Denmark that Ellesmere Island was a species of no-
man's-land not falling under the sovereignty of any country and
that Canadian game laws did not operate there . Rumours abounded in
Ottawa that Denmark might explore and "colonize the entire chain
of islands north of Parry Channel, using Greenland as an area of
lodgement. In such a context, with no response whatsoever coming
from the Danish foreign office, suspicions arose in, the Canadian
government of a possible, sinister Danish penetration in the northern
part of the Archipelago . Canadian officials, such as J .B . Harkin,=
Commissioner of Dominion Parks in the Department of the Interior,
and Loring C . ;Christie later-a leading Canadian diplomatist,
considered what Canada could
	
reinforce Canadian sovereignty .
With reference t Ellesmere Islan Mr . Harkin recommended
: "To
securely establish Canada's tit occupation and administration
are necessary . Therefore next spring (1921?) an expedition should
be sent north to locate two or three permanent police pcs
Ellesmere land ( is This probably should be ollowed by if_
the island . Steps should
ther'traders to extend
transfer of some Canadian Eskimos
taken to encourage the Hudson B
their operations northward, also desirable that detailed
32
exploration should be carried out this and adjoining islands
/
On an even higher executive level, Christie prepared a
memorandum late in 1920 for Prime Minister Arthur Meighen on
measures that wore imperative to establish Canadian sovereignty
in the Arctic . This memorandum was also prepared'; in the context of
a possible Danish claim to the islands north of Parry Channel d
especially Ellesmere Island :
The necessity for taking concrete steps t confirm
the Canadian assertion of sovereignty over the northern
Arctic islands has now become more urgent ; for information
has been received that the Government of Denmark, instead
of merely contemplating an expedition next, year to settle
Ellesmere' Island as previously reported, have actually
sent their expedition ; indeed it is understood tha
reached the scene of action in the summer of 1920 .
32/ Harkin, undated memorandum, (fall, 1920?) Title
to Northern Islands," (prepared for the Minister of
the Interior) Articislands :' Reports on Sovereignty file
Department of the Interior, R.G. 15 ; Series A-2 ; Vol .5
(P .A .C .) .
3 / Memorandum from Christieto the Prime Minister,
dated
October 28, 1920, "Lxploration and Occupation of the
Northern Arctic Islands," Department of the Interior,
R .G . 15, A-2, Vol . 1, P .A .C .) .
repeated local ac
to -
Confronted by the stealty exploration, use and occupation he
islands by Denmark, there were several steps the Government were
advised to take immediately to forestall an adverse Danish laim .
Mr . Christie emphasized that the permanent settlement of the area
that might be necessary in a locality
	
the temperate zone would not
be necessary in the Arctic . Some manner of seasonal." occupation
would-,be sufficient there . In the temperate zone in his opinion,
showing an intention of a continual claim,
would be necessary ; in Arctic, however, because of the in-
hospitable climate there might reasonably be intervals between
the acts . Among acts which the Government could rely on to show
animus dominendi were : (a) mapping expeditions, ". . .to complete
the mapping of lands already known and to discover any lands not
now known. ;' ; (b) step be taken at the same time and con-
junction with (a) to establish our customs, game law, and possibly
police administration
trategically selected points ; (c) the
operations under
and (b) to be combined . The ship conveying the
exploratory expedition should be classed as a revenue cutter, nd
could carry north customs, game law and perhaps
police officers
as well as others ; (d) " for the exploration work' the name of
Vilhjalmur Steffanson suggests itself, both because of his
connection with the previous expedition and because
of the economical
method of Arctic exploration and travel which he has developed
In a manner curiously similar to the supposed' Danish
penetration of the Archipelago, Christie advised that measures
taken
	
substantiate a future Canadian claim to Wrangel Isla
just f the Arctic coast of the Soviet Union :
cA
further question that might with advantage be
referred at the same time to the technical departments
oncerned is the feasibility of e ncouraging the quiet,
unostentatious settlement of Wrangel Island by some
Canadian development Co,, such as the Hudson Bay Co .
This if done would establish a basis for a subsequent
assertion of Canadian title to the'islan' an asset
that might prove of value in the future . 5 /
That the Canadian government was anxiously concerned about
consolidating its claim to the Arctic island can be seen from the
swiftness with which it implemented some of the above recouiuendations .
Beginning in the early 1920ts a large number' of Royal Canadian
Mounted Police detachments were established throughout the Arctic
Archipelago, including Ellesmere Island, 3-G/ and Mr . Steffanson's
subsequent expeditions into the Arctic were another manifestation
of this concern . By such actions, and by the failure of the
Danes to assert an adverse claim after '1920
)
, Canada's claim to Arctic
sovereignty was substantially strengthened, in succeeding decades .
Concerning the related problem, of the dimensions of Canadian
sovereignty over arctic waters, which will be dealt with i chapter
four, little controversy has hitherto arisen . It was only with the
successful voyage through the Northwest Passage of the American
supertanker	Manhattan in 1969 that the use of th ssage as
a commercial waterway became a probability . The need for an in-
expensive method of conveying oil from Alaska's North Slope to e
35/, Ibid ., paragraph 11,
acquisition of Wrange
3 / Vide infra,
on the ultimate Soviet
Island vide infra, 54-55
3 / See Baird, The Polar World, London, 1964, 173,
(hereinafter cited as Baird) and Riddell, Documents
on Canadian ForeignPolicy, 1917-1939, Toronto, 1962. 743 .
easternseaboard
	
the United States has stimulated research on
arctic navigation . And associated with such navigation, of course,
are the serious problems of arctic pollution, which caused the
Canadian government to take extensive egisiative measures
18 -
spring of 1970 . The necessity and legality of these
examined below. /
/ Vide infra, 112 ff, and ]35 ff .
measures
the
will
will vary
question .
regarded
generally
prescribe ; (b)
CHAPTER TWO
THE LEGAL REGIME OF ARCHIPELAGOES
The legally permissible delimitation
depending upon the category o island formation
The waters in the vicinity of an archipelago may
a) a particular instance of the legal regime applicable
to offshore waters, whatever such a general regime :m
special legal regime applicable only to
offshore waters
of a complex or irregular configuration (whether or not such coast-
lines belong to archipelagoes) and not to more "!regular" coastlines ;
(c) a particular legal; regime appropriate for archipelagoes alone,
which seeks to differentiate archipelagoes from other geographical
formations because of their peculiar characteristics and require-
ments, or (d)
	
portion of a "sector" including, possibly, the
permanent ice, well as the water, falling within the sector .
l(A)'The Posi ion of the Major Maritime Powers
In general, the major maritime nations have sought to
restrict, far as possible, encroachments on freedom of the seas
by confining maritime belts adjacent to archipelagoes to category
(a) . Thus, in the case of the Hawaiian Island Archipelago the
United States has made no claim for the application of a special
regime to the islands, and the United States District Court of, Hawaii
has held that "inter-island waters beyond the three-mile limit are
high seas ."
1/
Accordingly, the delimitation of offshore waters here
would constitute merely a specific instance of the general law o
l/' Civil Aeronautics Board v.Island Airlines, (1964)
235 F . Supp . 990 .
the sea, making
	
special provision for archipelagoes,,or "island
clusters This accords with the traditional approach, invoked
especially by the larger shipping nations in the inter st of
convenience according to which archipelaL~ic and other islands are
regarded as distinc units, each with its individual belt
territorial waters, rdinarily three, miles in breadth .
The British position also reflects this conservative
standard . There may be difficulty here, however, in ascertaining
exactly what constitutes an archipelago .  Thus, an "archipelag
might be distinguishable from non-contiguous scattered island
groupings not merely according to geographical criteria, but
2/also on historical or prescriptive grounds . Taking the American,
British or Japanese position, it could be that if one
.'took
a
hypothetical ring of islands not separated at the circumference
by more than twice the breadth of territorial waters the waters
within the whole formation would be effectively enclosed .. In such
a case, there could be hundreds of square miles of empty water in
the centre of the archipelago to which alien access would be cut
off . Aside from such a hypothetical construct,, the conservative
view would regard the inter-island waters, where they were located
beyond the relatively narrow belt of territorial waters, as being
part t high seas .
Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 6th ed .,
London, 1967, 120, (hereinafter cited as Colombos
For a reaffirmation of the traditional Japanese
support of the three-mile rule, see the remarks of
Hishahiko Okazaki, Third Secretary of the Japanese
Embassy in the Philippines, in'Coquia, '.'The Territorial
Waters of Archipelagoes
."
(1962) L . Philippine,Intl.L .J .
141, hereinafter cited as Coquia) .
The delimitation of archipelagic
boundaries
	
such
a manner primarily endorses the value of untrammelled maritime
communications . As has sometimes been observed, it represents a
marriage of free trade with gunboat diplomacy . Generally, nations
with large maritime interests such the United State Great
Britain 9 France and Japan have favoured such a' system
of delimiting
offshore boundaries so that there will be as few regulations as
possible
leets .
inhibiting the movements of their
naval forces and merchant
Where' the outer circumference of an archipelago has
an irregular and complex configuration, .as it almost alway will,
a system of straight baselines might be established connecting the
outermost islands, rocks, shoals and reefs, and enclosing the
whole
formation. In such a case, .the waters inside'' the, baselines are
ordinarily regarded as internal waters with a strip of territorial
waters being- measured outwards from the baselines .
Using the
Fisheries case4/ as a precedent in constructing such a system the
general trend of the coastline would be of more importance than t
length of specific baselines, as long as the baselines' were not,
unreasonably long. By the Royal Norwegian Decree of July 12th, 1935,
Norwegian territorial waters were measured outwards from a, series
of baselines connecting 48 fixed points along the Norwegian
coast,
some
I.C.J.,Reports, 1951, see Colombos
114, ff .
5/ Colombos 114.
e
of which were over 10 miles in length and . one of which was
forty-four miles long .-
When Canada established a twelve-mile contiguous
fishing zone along its eastern coast in 1957 one baseline, enclosing
Newfoundlandts Notre Dame , s forty-nine miles in
length.
Although this baseline exceeds somewhat the length of the longest
Norwegian baseline there is no reason, in principle,
not be acceptable if it adheres to the general trend
line.
There are other methods, in addition to the straight
baseline system, for delimiting offshore waters, such the
arcs-of-circles method . This method involves the drawing of
intersecting arcs-of-circles with a three-mile radius from all
promontories along the coast, creating an "envelope" with an
71
irregular perimeter.- The straight baseline and the arcs-of=circles
system can be used in conjunction with each other along the same
coastline ; where appropriate . Generally, straight baselines are more
appropriate along a_ deeply indented or concave coastline, and the
arcs-of-circles might be used further along he coast where there was
a somewhat less irregular outward slope .
See Schedule B to Territorial Sea and Fishing
Zones Act, P .C . 1967.2025, SOR -67-543 . The
Gulf of St . Lawrence could be enclosed by
straight baselines, without unduly stretching
precedent, if baselines - were - drawn across
Cabot Strait through St . Paul Island about
midway between Port-aux-Basques, Newfoundland
and Cape Breton Island (with the largest
closing' baseline being 45-miles long) .
For illustrations of the various methods of
delimiting boundaries see Boggs,"Delimitation
of the Territorial Sea," (1930) 24 A .J.I.L .
at 546-547, and Shalowitz,'Shore
.
and Sea -
Boundaries, Washington, 1962, vol.
	
Passim.
as
(C) Distinctive Archepelagic egimes
rtain states,
	
Indonesia and t Philippines
have unilaterally claimed as internal waters broad expanses
sea falling within a series of baselines around the external
perimeters of their archipelagoes . These claims are put forward
on economic and historical grounds as :,yell th basis that
the respective archipelagoes constitute geographical unities of
a more or less compact nature .
The Indonesian claim was asserted by the Council o
Ministers o December 13, 1957, ollows '
The waters around, between and connecting
the islands or parts of the islands' belonging
to the Indonesian archipelago, irrespective'
their width or dimension are natural'
appurtenances of its land territory and
therefore :'an integral part of the island or
national waters subject t the absolute
sovereignty of Indonesi
The waters falling within the basel-nes were claimed as internal
waters, the territorial sea of .Indonesia being delimited outwards
from such baselines to a breadth of twelve nautical miles.
The United States State Department, however, has
strongly disapproved of the Indonesian ; claim. "The United States
wrongful and unacceptable appropriations of the high
seas any claim to more than three miles of territorial waters as
well ''as any alleged right to convert into internal or, territorial
waters large areass of the high seas in and around the islands which
have traditionally been used as high seas by the vessels of
nations
d e ation
historical
case of the Phil' ines,
	
ilippine
the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva cited
eographic, political and economic circumstances to
stify the appropriation large expanses of archipelagic waters :
In just-!l-Eying their pos :tion, the Ph ip pine
delegation maintained that the Philippine Arch-
ipelago consists of a continuous chain of islands
or islets lying closely together so that straight.
baselines could easily be drawn between appropraite
points on outeri~;3ands or-is!zt~ in such as way
as to encircle the whole' archipelago without
crossing unreasonably large expanses of water and
without infringing the principles laid down b the
International Court of Justice in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fish r e ase . Accordingly, it was
proposed that a rule s ould be laid down . under
which outlying archipelagoes like the Philippines
may be treated as a single unit and the waters
lying between and within the islands should 'be
considered as internal waters
The relevant statement of the Philippine government on which this
position was based reads as follows :
The Philippine Government considers the
limitations of the territorial sea as referring
those waters within the recogr n ed treaty limits
and for this reason it takes the view that the
breadth of the territorial sea may extend beyond
twelve miles„ It may therefore be necessary to
make exceptions, upon historical grounds or by
means of treaties or conventions between the states .
It would seem also that the rule prescribing the
limits of the territorial sea has been based largely
on the continental nature of the coastal state .
The. Philippine Government is of the opinion that certain
provisions should be made taking into account the
archipelagic nature of certain states like the Philippines-.
Coduia 145 .
/ Note verbale dated January 20, 1956, from the Permanent
Mission of the Philippine ; to the United Nations . Docu-
ment A-CN, Yearbook of the InternationalLaw, Commission,
1956 1 . 70 .
Both Indonesia and the Philippines are
	
course,
widely scattered groups of islands and the construction of a
system of baselines enclosing them cannot easily be reconciled
with the Fisheries precedent. When one considers that the ilipp nes
is comprised of 7,104 island while Indonesia comprises 13,000
islands of which only some 3,000 are inhabited, the complexity
a system of baselines enclosing either of them, become apparent .
In the case of the Philippine Archipelago, some baselines are
from 1.30 to 160 miles long 1 similar baselines exist in
Indonesi he Indonesian Archipelago considered,' as a whole being
more than 3,000 miles length .
Indonesia and the Philippines belong the genus of non-adjacent
or outlying (mid-ocean) archipelagoes as contrasted with the
coastal archipelagoes of such states as Norway, Yugoslavia eland,
Cuba or Australia . 13 As the existence of Cuba and Iceland in
the latter classification would seem to indicate, the distinction
not merely one of whether the archipelago appertains to an island or
a continent, but rather whether the archipelago, considered as a
whole, is preponderantly insular in nature or whether it is a, compact
group of islands along the coast of a larger land, mass, whether: such
a land mass be classified as an island or a portion of a continent.
I
It should, be remembered that
/ See Philippines Republic Act .- No . 3046, approved
June 17, 1961, U.N.L.S. Supplement to the Laws and
Regulations of the Regime' of the Territorial'Sea,
Document' No A. -Conf. 19-5 Add . 1 at 3-4 .
See McDougal and Burke, The PublicOrder of the Oceans,
New Haven, 1962, 411 ff . (hereinafter cited as McDougal
and Burke), and Evenson, ."Certain Legal Aspects Con-
cerning the Delimitation of Territorial Waters of
Archipelagoes," U. N . Conf, on the Law of the Sea (U .N .
Doe. No . A-Conf .,19-8, 1960) 1 ,OfficialRecords, 289,
(hereinafter cited 'as - Evenson) .
McDougal nd Burke refer the conflicting interests
archipelaoic states such
	
Indonesia and the Philippines
the systems they have established for delimiting their territorial
other states in the international community :
The island groups non-adjacent archipe .agoes)
involved here are those unconnected with a continental
coast, such as the Philippine Islands, Indonesia, the
Galapagos Islands of Ecuador and the State of Hawaii
the United States . The major claim sometimes made
to delimit the territoriai-sea from a line connect-
i the outermost island's and to include all waters
within the line as internal waters . The primary
counterclaim asserts that an islandin an : -rciipcla
does not differ from any other island and that each
should have only its own belt of territorial seal ;
in this view, there would be no question of
straight
baselines or internal waters . A possible' alternative
either outcome would be to permits . the use of a
single territor'~al sea for the islands as a unit but
to regard the waters within the baseline as part
the territorial sea .l
4 /
noteworthy that in this passage the authors describe non-
adjacent archipelagoes as "those unconnected with a continental coast .
As contended above, however, if adjacency" the criterion for
differentiation between' the various types of archipelagoes, with non
adjacent archipelagoes like Hawaii and the Galapago on the one hand,
and coastal archipelagoes like those of Norway and Cu on the other,
being extreme types, then the crucial taxonomic consideration is not
the proximity of an archipelago to a continental land mass, but its
characterr considered as a . whole and its relation, if to its
parent formation. In classifying the islands situated to the north
f he Canadian mainland as a "coastal" or as a "non-adjacent'
archipelago, for example, their relative position in relation,to
the North American continent might not be
as important as their
in
character considered
	
whole . No other continental state possesses
such a large and r flung group of islands on its perimeter . Although
distance of more than two
thousand miles and from just north of the Canadian land mass almost
to the Pole, they are relatively compact, and have a unitary aspect
It is not, of course, suggested that they would be classifiable as
non- acent archipelago, which is .distinguishable because its
distance from the nearest continent but, geographically considered,
they might belong to an intermediate category between "non-adjacent"
the islands extend from east to west for
and "coastal archipelagoes.
The precise classification of the Arctic Archipelago
could be of great significance, . since the legal regime appliable
to its waters could well depend on whether it resembled more the
7
Indonesian than the Norwegian or Cuban archipelagoes . It is
suggested that if contemporary international law is to have relevance
to present needs, must develop sufficient' flexibility to reconcile
the divergent interests of individual, states and the world community .
15/'' See, however, Pharand, "The Waters of the
Canadian Arctic Islands,"' in (;1969) 3 Ottawa
Law Review, 414, where the author contends
that the broad-waterway through : the centre of
the Archipelago separates the archipelagic
islands into two distinct groups . ITe argues,
that each of these groups might' be, enclosed by
baselines, the seas within being claimed as
Canadian territorial waters . The large corridor
between : the groups would be available for un-
restricted international navigation Professor
Pharand's suggestion was made, of course t before
the official announcement of Canadian government
policy in April, 1970.
Where existing classifications do riot fit a situation, new class-
ifications and new norms, must be created . While striving to
retain its coherence, international law must keep abreast of new
needs in international society by developing new legal concepts
where older ones prove to be inadequate .
The Arctic Archipelago is not similar to other arch-
ipelagoes discussed by McDougal and Burke on the one hand and by
Evenson on the other . It has both the elements of "compactness"
and ity presented by the Philippines and the characteristic
of propinquity to a land mass presented by the archipelagoes of
Australia or Cuba which, however, are not so large or distinct
as the Arctic Archipelago. The ice which binds together the
various Arctic islands represents another significant natural
difference between the arctic and other archipelagoes . In a
globe on which there are an indefinite number of geographical
gradations, and where sharply-defined abstract classifications may
not fit specific formations, one should not be too hasty in
classifying the Arctic . Archipelago into the present perhaps
rigid categories .
	
might be suggested, in fact, that the Archi-
pelago is an intermediate species between the genera, respectively,
of coastal archipelagoes (e.g . Iceland, Norway); and non-adjacent
archipelagoes (e .g.Rhilippines, Indonesia) . This distinction i
significant if one assumes, as do the Philippines, Indonesians and
Norwegians that different legal regimes : may apply to different
types of archipelagoes .
(D) The Sector Theory
According to the sector theory, first . enunciated
the Canadian Senate on February 19th, 1907 oy Senator Pascal
Poirier,
16/
the poplarregion was allocated respectively to those
states bordering on the Arctic Ocean . The French diplomat and
jurist Rene Dollot describes
	
ector follows :
Un procede de rcpartition des terres
polaires entre les Etats cjui se trouvent places
au voisinage de ces terres, le-secteur constltutant
un triangle spherique dont le sommet est au pole,
donet les c8tes sont les meridiens et la base une
cote ou des paralleles.t7 /
In other wor hypothetical parallels of longitude are extended
northwards to the Pole from those parts of the Arctic Ocean at the
16/ . Senator Poirier's resolution was as follows :
"That it be resolved that the Senate is of the
opinion that the time has come for Canada to
make a formal declaration of possession of the
lands and islands situated in the North of the
Dominion and extending to, the North Pole,"
Canada, Senate, 20 February .3907 . In the course
of his argument, Senator Poirier allocated
"sectors" in the Arctic to Norway, Sweden, Russia
and the U ited States (Alaska), in addition to
Canada .
1. / Dollot, "Le Droit .International des Espaces Polaires
in (1949).2 Recueildes Cours, Academie de Droit
International, 127 (hereinafter cited as Dollot)' .
The passage may be translated: "A method of part-
itioning polar territory between states situated ;
in the neighbourhood of such territory, the sector
constituting a spherical triangle whose summit is
at the Pole, the sides of which are the meridians
and the base a seacoast of the parallels .
eastern and western extremity of each Arctic' state . All undiscovered
islands within the Arctic Ocean falling within each sector are
allocated to the state possessing the sector . The, exact legal status
of the permanent ice and waters within the sectors has not been
finally settled . In fact, the legitimacy of thus apportioning the
Arctic regions, in so far as it implicitly excludes the possibility
of northern possessions for states not having a northern frontier ,
has been strongly challenged .
As Dollot mentions the virtue of the sector theory ;
itit can be called such, is that it authoritatively allocates
sovereignty over undiscovered territory amongpotential claimants .
It recalls the celebrated partition of the New World' between Spain
and Portugal 1493 in a'Bull promulgated by Pope Alexander VI,
the rough geographical division__ between the
Portuguese-speaking people of Brazil and their . hispanic neighbours
legacy of which
the West. - If there is a-consensus in favour of the sector theory,
/
and the delimitation of the sectors themselves is agreed upon,the
19/ Controversy erupts from time to time between Great
Britain, Chile and Argentina because of the overlapping
of theirr sectors. in Antarctica. . In the south polar
region there is no natural tableland extension to
confer upon sector claims ardegree of geographic
legitimacy . Consequently, such "sector", claims are
based on discovery and exploration of an area of lodg-
ment -along the coast or, as in the case of Great
Britain, on the projection of meridians southwards
from a colony, the Falkland Islands . Since Argentina
contests the Antartic sector claim based upon it,
see (1947) 41 A.J.I.L., 117 and Supplement,, 11, for
the Argentine claim. On Antarctic claims generally
see, 1 Hackworth, InternationalLaw, 449-62 ; Smedal,
Acquisition of SovereigntyoverPolar Areas,' Oslo,
1931, .54-76, and Hayton, "Polar : Problems and Inter-
national Law," (1958) 52 A.J.I.L. 746-65 .
principle may preclude petty quarrels over title to northern territo
such
	
the incipient issue between Canada and Russia over Wrang
Island, which was occupied by Canada for a time, but clearly fell
w thin the Russian sector.-/ There is no doubt <in element or
arbitrariness, however in making title contingent on the location
of hypothetical lines . Even some states with an arctic frontier
have refused to endorse the sector principle . As Dollot mentions,
the refusal by the United States to do . so may reflect a vein of
opportunism because there are, apparently, no territories located
within the American "sector" between the State of Alaska andthe
Pole 2-1/
Senator Poirier's 1907 resolution was neither seconded
nor voted upon. in
the Senate, and could in no way be construed as
a statement of government policy . In 1925, howeve , the Minister
of the Interior laid claim to all lands "discovered yet to be
discovered" between the meridians of 60 0 and 141' west longitude .22/
Prime Ministers St . Laurent and Pearson have on different occasions
endorsed the sector princip 2 / and have suggested that Canada has
20/ Morris, "Boundary Problems Relating to Sover-
eignty in the Canadian Arctic," (1969) 6 Musk-
02.3ournal 51 .
21/ Dollot, 1 .42 ; Cf . Smedal, Acquisition ofSover-
eignty over Polar Areas, Oslo, 1931, 62 .
Canad , Parliament, House of Commons Debates,
_1925, vol . 4, 4084 .
For Prime Minister St . Laurent's endorsement see
House of Commons Debates, (1953-54) vol .-,1,,700,
and for Prime Minister Pearson's affirmation .: see
"Canada Looks Down North," (1945-46) 24 Foreign
Affairs, 638 .
y,
3title
	
the waters as well he te~:ritoly noth the mainland .
On the other hand, Jean Lesage and Alvin Hamil uring their
respective tenures as Ministers of Northern Affairs and National
Resources have placed Canadian claims in the Arctic more on the
basis of "effective
M Lesage attempted -to elucidate the vernment
position on Arctic sovereignty in replying to a question i the
House of Commons in 1956 :
We have never subscribed to the sector theory
in relation to the ice . We are content that our
sovereignty exists over all the Arctic islands .
There is no doubt about it and there are no
difficulties concerning it . Our sovereignty h
never been endangered by the installation of the
D .E.W . line. We have agreements with the United
States and the facts are there to prove we have
sovereignty over our northern territory . We
have never upheld a general sector theory. To
our mind the sea, be it frozen or in its natural
liquid state, is the sea ; and our sovereignty
exists over the lands and over our territorial
waters .24'
Referring to the so-called sector "lines" first places on Canadian
maps in 1903, Mr . Lesage argued that they were not boundaries but
occupancy" than on the sector principle .
that their purpose was merely '" . . .to show the lines within which
the lands and territorial waters around those lands were claimed
by Canada, because at . that time and for a number of years after-
wards many of the islands of the Arctic not been discovered
and
	
was no known what islands would exist in the interior
that sector He added that the "broaded (sic) sector theory,
"which Canada had not adhered entailed a claim to "sovereignty
over waters beyond your territorial waters .
2,)
-
Mr . Les successo the Eonourable-Alvin Hamilton,
replyb arliament 958 to a question posed by Mr . Lesage,
left open the issue of t e ownership of ice and waters adjacent
the Arctic Archipel
. . .The Arctic Ocean is covered for the most part
the year with polar pack ice having an average thick-
ness of about eight feet . Leads of water do open up
as a result of the pack ; ice being in constant motion
but or practical. purposes it might be said for the
most part to be a permanently' frozen sea . It will
seen then that the Arctic Ocean north of the archi-
pelago is not open water nor has it the stable
qualities of land . Consequently the ordinary rules
of international law may or may nothave application
25/ Ibid ., 6958 . Mr . Lesage may be in error in s
last-quoted remarks inasmuch as he is implying
that lines placed on a map in 1903 reflected
a theory which was first put forward by Senator
Poirier in 1907 . It is noteworthy,as Professor_
Pharand has pointed out that " . . .the Physical
Geography section' of the Canada Year Book states
that "in latitude it (Canada) stretches from
Middle Island in Lake Erie, at 410 410 N . to the North
Pole," apparently with the sanction of the Department
of Energy, Mines and Resources (Pharand, "Freedom
of the Seas in the Arctic Ocean," (1969) 19 U .T.L .J .
229-230) .
26/ House f Commons Debates, 1956, 6958
27/ Ibid 1957-58, 1559 .
27/
occupation .
While he was Canadian Ambassa o to the . United States
in 1946, Lester B.-Pearson asserted that Canadian sovereignty
.the islands and the frozen sea north of the
mainland between the meridians of its east and west boundaries
extended to the North Pole ." V Mr . Pearson amplified his earlier
statements, and attempted to recapitulate the position of
successive Canadian governments
	
television prograuuue broad-
case in November, 1969 :
. . .I don't think . we've ever claimed jurisdiction
to anything that could be considered as open sea .
What we have done in the past and there have been
many statements about this from 1946 especially
on we have put forward what is called the "sector
theory"" and the land inside your construction of
your east and west boundaries to the pole . Now we
have thought that permanent ice could be assimilated
to land but if its pack ice its not permanent.3l?/
Mr . Pearson s reference t "pack ice' concerned ;a . report from
Moscow by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation that the Soviet
Union was claiming title to pace ice within the Russian sector .
The former prime minister explained that the significance of
repeated government statements on Arctic sovereignty after 1946
was related to the develop 'cold war . With the polar' area
acquiring enhanced military significance as the shortest route to
many targets for nuclear-equipped ; aircraft or inter-continental
34
Subsequently Parliament Mr . Hamilton endorsed Canadian title
Arctic territory, primarily on the basis of effective
/ Ibid ., '1.958, 1979and 1989 .
30/' C .B .C . . Weekend, elevision rboadcas
9 November, 196
ballistic missiles, t was in
	
national interest claim
the Arctic sector as Canadian territory to es iblish a cordon
least
sanitaire for defensive purposes . One would expect that,
this respect, there ought to be a community
of interest between Canada and the U-1 ted States in sustainin,
the Canadian sector claim .
A parliamentary debate in 1969 disclosed the opinions
two other Canadian prime ministers on the sector principle :
R Hon. J.G. Diefenbaker : . . . is it not a fact that
Canada's stand through has been in favour of the
sector principle and that view was expresscd
Canada at the Geneva Conference in 1958 and not
disputed by the United States or the U.S .S .R? Does
the Prime Minister accept the sector principle, and
if he does, and if that is still the policy o'_' the
government of Canada, then waterways are in the same'
position as islands and other lands?
R Hon. Pierre E . Trudeau : Mr . Speaker, not
have the same understanding of this a's the Right
Hon . gentleman . I believe that the sector principle
applies to the seabed and the shelf . If does not
apply to the waters . The continental shelf is of
course under Canadian sovereignty i the
seabed butnot the waters over the shelf
.31
In examining the statements made on the sector principle
successive Canadian prime ministers and cabinet mambers,
difficult to detect a uniform policy woven into the whole
While the specific content of the policy is not clear, at least
the four most recent prime ministers - St. Laurent, Diefenbaker,
Pearson and Trudeau --- have all found the concept of a sector
principl either alone or in con unction with other indicia
of title meaningful however variously they have interpreted
fabric .
3 / House CommonsDebates, 10 March, 1969, 6396 .
in 1930,
	
out the reasons for the espousal y his
government
of a sector claim he Russian Arctic, citing Canadian practice
32/in support of its position . A-cording Lakhtine, because of
its physical environment the requirement of 'effective occupatio
basis for sovereignty over Arctic territory was unseasonable .
Lakhtine does not enunciate detail why this should be but
he is obviously referring
inaccessibility
normal pursuits difficult . Granted that "effective occupation"
is not a prerequisite for Arctic sovereignty,
he add we
are forced to the collateral conclusion that we must disavow the
whole tri le formula of occupation, e,, discovery occupation
and notification follows that the traditional or customary
modes of acquiring territory in other' latitudes are not approp-
riate for the Arctic, and that there must be substituted for
them " . . .the doctrine of
region of attraction. The con-
sequence of adopting such a view
he inhospitable, climate and the
the region which makes human habitation and
that " . . .lands and islands
being still undiscovered are already presumedto
belong	the
national'territoryof the adjacent Polar;Statein the sector
of the region of attraction in which they are'to be found ."
s article, Lakhtine was actually expounding the rationale
32/ Lakhtine, 'Rights Over the Arctic (1930)
24 .A.J.I .L . On the Soviet ; view of polar sovereignty
see also Lapenna, Conceptions-Sovietiques
de Droit
International Public, Paris, 1954, 256-263 .
33/ Lakhtine, bid 710 (emphasis by Lakhtine
article published
respectively,
of the Soviet
	
ctor claim to the Arctic which had been formally
promulgated four years earlier . In the relevant decree, Soviet
sector boundaries described conver ing at the North Pole were
situated between the meridian of east longitude 32 0 4' 35" nd
the meridian of west longitude 1 00 ,49 1 1 30", ch defin
oviet national boundaries .
be based on
extreme easternnitoat>and westernmost limits-
/
Hackworth describes certain claims to Arctic territory
made by Russia in 1916 as also falling under the ':'sector principl
but his case there was
specific Russian sector :
On November 1916, the Russian Ambassador
Washington sent a note . to the . Department of. State
calling; attention to thee annexation of certain newly-
discovered 'ands in the Arctic . The Russian Govern-
ment claimed as "part and parcel of the Empire" several
Arctic . islands lying near the Arctic coast as'con-
stituting "an extension northward of the Continental
tableland of Siberia
.n36/
One might query Hackworth's classification of this 1916 claim under
the ctor principl however, since it reflects title by
"continuity" or the geographical extension of the continental table-
land, whereas the "sector principle" would appear more properly
ntiguity", or the geographical nearness ofthe
ormal proclamation defining
in
continental state to the Arctic region. A clear differentiation
between the two bases of title can be made in that the former one
would not seem to be as comprehensivee as the latter . There could,
for instance be no further claims after thecontinental table-
land came to an end, as it well might do before, it reached the
Pole (theccntinuity principle), but notwithstanding such "dis-
continuity", c aim under the sector principle (under ontiguity
could still entertained right up to the Pole
1 Hackworth, International Law, 461 .,
35 Decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive
Committee, U .S,S .R., April 15, 1926, cited in 2 White-
man, International Law, Washington, 1963,1268
A strict interpretation of the above Soviet Decree
1926 would confine its operation solely
	
lands within the
Soviet sector discovered and undiscovere-t which had not been
/ Associatedrecognized by Moscow "property of another state
with the mentioned claim, however,
to Arctic waters covering the Northeast assag- lrom Novaya
Zemlaya and Franz Josef Land to the, entrance of the Bering S
The Soviet sector . claim, along with the concurrentL claim to
historic waters, represents a more sweeping assertion f sovereignty
over Arctic lands and waters than made a other polar state32'
e extensive historic claims
37/ 1 Hackworth, International -,aw, 461 .
38/ See the illustrative chart appended to Mouton,
"The International Regime of the Polar Regions
1962, 111 Recueil des Gours, Academie de Droit
International, (hereinafter cited as Mouto
and-cf . Lapenna, .op .cit .,-in. 32 supra, at
257-258 : "DA's -1926, le Professeur Korovine
exprime l'opinion que les .mer arctiques doivent
etre traitees dune facon analogue a celles des
territoires arctiques, c'est-a-dire que la
souverainete de L'U .R .S.S . doit sly entendre .
Seule une telle interpretation, tres large, du
decret du 15 avril 1926 --- ecrivait alors
Korovine --- assure les droit souverains de l'Union
sovietique sur ces regions . I1's'agit des mers
de la Mer Tchoukout'qui se trouve dans les limites
du secteur--polaire sovietique . La mer de Behring . . .
t la mer .d e Barents'sont toutes les deux considerees
par doctrine sovietique comme mers ouvertes
3 J Cf . Mouton, cit .
(a) rigorous ice conditions make all vessels attempting the
"northern maritime route" absolutely dependent
	
Soviet ice-
breaking and meteorological services for a successful transit ;
(b) the seas have not hitherto, fact, constituted an
international commercial sea route,~l~and (c) ancient-his-
torical claims to the Kara forming the easternmost por-
tion of the waters claimed, were unprotested by foreign states,
and the Arctic seas generally were regarded longin
The Soviet writer A .N. Nikolaev sets out hist-
orical asis of the extensive Soviet claim :
The author of this work is in agreement
with the Soviet scholars who regard as 'historic'
and subject to the regime of internal waters of
the U .S .S .R . the seas which form bays in the
Siberian coast: the Sea of Kara, the Laptev
the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea . Many
centuries were required by Russian navigators to
establish mastery ;' over these seas, ;,hich now con-
stitute a national waterway of try Soviet State.
Through these seas passes the northern maritime
route from Murmansk and Archangel to Vladivostok
which was only opened through the'pr d~gious
efforts of our heroic Soviet people .40
The arguments advanced by Soviet scholars to suppor regime
suigeneris over broad expanses of Arctic seas for
the most part, be used by other polar : states
other polar waters. Vishnepolsky, for examp
nationalize
asserts that
40/ Nikolaev, Problema Territoriainykh Vod V
Mezhdunarodnomprave, oted in Evenson,
/ This argumen especially, would apply
such polar sea routes as the Canadian
Northwest Passage .
to
4Russia from the time of Ivan the Terrible (1533-1584.
The Dutch jurist Mouton emphasizes th .=it according
the oviet Union, no right of innocent passage
	
foreign
vessels exists through the above-mentione Arctic waters
because they are claimed "internal" seas . Actually, this
would mean that there was international
the Russian mainland since the are the north of Soviet
ternal waters" would rendered im)assable aay ice . In
refutation of the common Soviet claim that the Northeast
Passage was opened up by "Russian navigators" Mouton -points o t
route north
42/ Mouton strongly disputes the Soviet claim on
the following grounds . (a) In future, foreign
icebreakers and reconnaissance aircraft might
escort their own vessels without hindrance,
and without Soviet assistance, through the
Northeast Passage ; (b) Although, by the Soviet
view, unauthorized overflights by aircraft over
"internal seas" would be prohibited equally
with navigation of such seas by foreign vessels,
the control' of ice hazards would be required
only on the latter ground, and the enclosure o
large area of airspace would pose a considerable
inconvenience to international air traffic ;
(c) the term 'historic seas' is unknown
contemporary international law and 'historic bays
are not permissiblewithout headlands of specific
dimensions through which baselines might be drawn ;
(d) a- claim to sovereignty over super-jacent waters
of. the continental shelf is unwarranted under the
Geneva Convention_ on the Continentai Scielf, 1958 ;
(e) the impermanence and instability of polar ice
are impediments to a valid claim to Arctic se
since they are not assimilable to land "large
canals and open places being formed and disappearing
again" ; (f) there are increasing indications that
the Arctic Ocean will become a thoroughfare for
ships of many nations, as well . as for aircraft,
witness the recent transits . i n the area of the
North Pole by the U.S . nuclear : submarines Nautilus
and Skate, (Mouton, 201-202) .
- 41 -
The Present Relevance f th Sector Principle
One may seriously question the relevance
	
present
circumstances of the "sector principle .
ceived, the ectors were proclaimed by Canada and the
U .S .R. to establish a claim to undiscovered territory
contiguous to Arctic frontiers which they, as Arctic powers
could most conveniently exploit, and which might otherwise
be appropriated by strangers. With the increase in exploration
.polar navigation and aerial surveys in recent years however,
it is virtually certain that there are no remaining undiscovered
islands in the Arctic Ocean. (Of course, if permanent ice
were assimilable to land, the Canadian sector boundaries, which
transect the permanent ice as they converge towards the Pol
could serve as actual frontiers .) It is clear that recent
technological advances have made it easier for all states,
whether or not they are physically adjacent to the Arctic
establish scientific, meteorological, defensiveor other
installations Polar areas . For states like . Norway 43/
recognizing Canadian sovereignty over the
Sverdrup Islands in 1930, the Norweigian note
expressly stipulated : " . . .my government is
anxious to emphasize that their recognizance
of the sovereignty of His Britannic Majesty
over these islands is in no way based on
any sanction whatever of what is named 'the
sector principle' ." 1. Hackworth, ,International
L
As originally con-
and the United Stat s
4
ich have repudiated claims under
the sector principi might theoretically be possible to
lodge rival claims in sectors appropriated by Canada or e
U .S .S .R . on the basis that effective occupation
45/
exploitation were superior ground of title.-- Since
there does n
	
seem to be any further unappropriated
territory he Arctic, however, perhaps this question is
an academic one .
In addition o their respective claims under the
sector theory Canada and Russia have, through governmental
acts, the administration of native peoples, serial rescues
police protection, defence activities and other ac
displayed the animus dominendi which is one of the essential
ingredients of sovereignty . In other words, Canada. has not
relied wholly on the 'sector principle' to buttress its claim
arctic territory . It in effect, reinforced its
claim by manifesting governmental control over the whole area .
44/ C the United: States has not recognized
-called 'Sector Principle') as a valid
principle for claiming jurisdiction .' 1 Assist-
and legal adviser' Whiteman to Lt . Cmdr . John
C . Fry, U .S .N ., letter dated January 7, 1959,
MS ., Department of State, file, 703 .022/12-1758,
2 Whiteman, International Law, 1268 .
/ If the capacity to exploit natural resources in
territory having a harsh climate is the .=est
sovereignty, it might -inherently discriminate
against those states whose technology was
relatively less well advanced than others,
ust as it is sometimes argued that the 'sector
principle' itself discriminates against those
who are geographically further removed from
the Pole .
Although, egally speaking, they are independent grounds
title, the 'sector principle' and 'effective occupancy' are
complementary inasmuch
	
th former indicates the geograph c I
dimensions within which the Canadian government purports
exercise actual control . It should be stressed this
connection that the intention to exercise sovereign authority over
a desolate and uninhabited region can be, inferred, rt, from
the terms of domestic legislation extending to local
legislation purports to extend to such an area, there has
been no protest by other states, either to such legislation
or to official acts performed thereunder, notwithstanding the
fact that it endeavours to control activities away from settled
area there still. the animus dominendi which can through
time give rise to a title superior to that which may be asserted
by other state . 4 The judgment in the Eastern Greenland
case instructive this respect . The principal issue in
the case arose from Norway claim to Eastern Greenland ; the
Norwegians contended that the eastern part of Greenland was a
terra nullius which they might appropriate, Danish sovereignty
being confined to t e Southwest coast which was the main focus
of Danish activities . In speaking of Danish legislation
extending to unsettled parts of Greenland, the Court said :
.Legislation is one of the most obvious
forms of the exercise of sovereign power,
and it is clear that the operation of these
enactments was not restricted to the limits
of the colonies. It therefore follows that
the sovereign right in; virtue of which the
enactments were issued cannot have been 47/
restricted to the limits of the colonie
46/ Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P .C.I .J .
(1933), Series A/B.,-No . 53, 49 .
47/ Ibid ., loc . cit .
he same case, Court indicated that, in the absence
adverse claims to sovereignty over remote, unsettled areas,
title could . be substantiated with less rigour han would e
necessary in densely populated regions :
.bearing
	
mind theeabsence- any claim to
sovereignty by another power, and the Arctic
and inaccessible character of the uncolonized
parts of the country, the King of Denmark and
Norway displayed . . . .his authority to
an extent
sufficient to give his country a valid claim to
sovereignty, and that his rights over %~7enland
were not limited to the colonized area.
The United States has been consistent in its require-
ment that a more exacting test than mere discovery or physical
contiguity (asunder the 'sector principle') be applied to
determine title to unoccupied lands or so-called terrae null:ius .
Thus, during the Coolidge administration, Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes advised' a correspondent of the reasons
why the_. United States was reluctant to proclaim a title to
certain Antarctic territory merely on, the basis of discovery :
It is the opinion of the Department that the
discovery of lands unknown -to civilization, even
when coupled with a formal taking of, possession
does not support a valid claim' of sovereignty .
unless the discovery is followed by an actual
settlement of the discovered country . In the
absence of, an Act of Congress'asserta .tive in a
domestic sence of dominion over Wilkes Land this
department would be reluctant to declare that
the United States possessed a right of sovereignty
over that terri'tory .49/
4 / Ibid .$ 50-51 . (The validity of Danish title
to Greenland rested in part on .the sovereignty
over_ the island of the King of Denmark and
Norway, to whose : rights Denmark. succeeded
when the countries separated at the end
the Napoleonic_wars) .
49/ Secretary Hughes to A .W . Prescott, y 1924,
1 Hackworth, International Law,,,399 .
The United States still declines to accept the 'sector princi
;n /
valid title to territoryan hadno.t itself asserted such
titlein what s sometimes termed the United States sector
of Antarctica .- Shortly before the ratification by the United
States' of the Antarctic Treaty, 1959, which had the effect of
neutralizing the Antarctic continent and suspending during the
currency of the: treaty, territorial claims therein 5 the State
Department legal adviser declared : "the United States has not
asserted. any claim to sovereignty over any portion of Antarctica,
although the United States has, at the same time, made f perfect-
ly plain that it didnot recognize any such claims made by other
states."
53/
Accordingly, both theoretically and in practice,
the United States has shown' reluctance to concede that title
to territory in the polar regions could be acquired with greater
faculty than in other areas . It is important to note however,
than Secretary Hughes's above-mentioned' statement was made
several years before' the decision by the World Court in the
Eastern Greenland case which, although it was :.predi,cated on
a:particular context, implicitly relaxed the requirements for
the assertion of territorial sovereignty in polar areas .
50/ See
	
44 at 4 supra.
51/ See f 19 30 supra.
Articles 1 and Xil in 2 Whiteman,
International Law,' 1232 ff .
2 Whiteman International Law, 1250 .
11 CASE LAW ON ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY
Even if one assumes that the more rigorous test of
ownership to unoccupied territory through "effective occupation
laid d wn in the Island of Palmas54/ case and the Clipperton
ase applies,
	
argument could still be made out,
as was indicated above,-:'-- conferring on Canada and similarly-
situated powers, sovereignty over their remo sparsely
settled Arctic lands .
In the Palmas case a dispute arose in 1906 between
the United States and the Netherlands concerning title to the
island of Palmas, a small, isolated island midway between the
southernmost Philippine island of Mindanao and the nearest part
of the Netherlands Indies, By a compromis entered into
1925 and setting-out the terms of reference of the arbitration
the controversy' was submitted for settlement to the Permenant
Dr . Max Huber sat single
arbitrator case, applying both general international law
and special treaty provisions -.
The title of the United States rested''on its succession
to the rights of Spain as cessionary of that state under the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, which ended the Spanish-
American War . T Americans argued that the island was discovered
54/ Arbitral Awardinthe Island ofPalmasCase,
United Statesandthe Netherlands, April 4, 1928,
(P .C .A .) 26-27, see (1928) 22 A .J.I.L. 867 for
the text of the decision (hereinafter cited
as Palmas),
55/ Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Differences
Relativeto the Sovereignty over'Clipperton
Island, January 28, 1931, see (1932) 26 A.J.I .L.
390 for the text of the decision(hereinafter
cited' as Clipperton) .
56/ Videsupra, 42.-44 and chapter three, infra .
by Spai
	
that it was a contiguous pa t o th Philippine
archipelago . It h moreover, beenrecognized as a part
Spanish territory by other European powers in 1648 in the
5
Treaty of Munster, and in other later treatie
7/
The Netherlands, other hand, contended that
with some inconsequential interruptions, they had actually
administered the island since 1677 throughthe Dutch East
India Company
. Their administration constituted,
ffective occupation" over the island, and was,preceded by
agreements with local ative potentates who voluntarily
submitted to Dutch rule . The relavant agreements excluded
the local princes from entering into relations with foreign
Sovereigns and even in important economic matters, with
their own nationals
. The Dutch issued their own local currency
which served legal tender
Palmas, they assumed juris-
diction over foreign transients,
charged the local govern-
ment with the duties of suppressing slavery, prostitution
and piracy
. There was an authoritative allocation of govern-
mental functions between the Dutch, on the one hand, local
magnates on the other . While, it would be difficult to categorize
the exact status of the island within the Dutch Empire the
Dutch administered the territory foreign relations and important
parts of its internal government .
In giving his decision, Judge Huber gave paramount
force to what might be called the 'prescriptive' title of the
reality,
5 / While the argument is understandable e
context of an adversary process, it is note-
worthy that two of the important elements by
which the United States .urged that it was
sovereign of Palmas, viz ., 'discovery' and
'contiguity' are elements which it has found
.inadequate as a basis for title in polar areas :
see Secretary Hughes's statement supra, 47 .
by the Dutch over the island, while American tit
to be found, rest the more tenuous grounds
or 'contiguity' .
The acts
	
indirect o direct display
of Netherlands sovereignty at Palmas (or Miangas
especially in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries are not numerous, and there are consid-
erable gaps in the evidence of continuous display .
But apart from the consideration that the mani-
festations of sovereignty over a small and distant
island, inhabited only by natives, cannot be
expected to be frequent, it is not necessary that
the display of sovereignty should go back to a
very distant period . It may suffice that such
display existed in 1898, and had already existed
continuous and peaceful before that date long
enough to enable any power who might have considered
herself as possessing sovereignty over the area, or
having a claim to sovereignty,' to have, according
to local conditions, a reasonable possibility for
ascertaining the existence of a state of things
contrary to her real or alleged rights .
5_8 /
Netherlands over Palmas . There had been a lengthy, continuous
and peaceful (or unopposed) display of governmental authority
it were
'discovery'
contradistinction
he Dutch display of officia authority,
Spanish 'title', by contiguity had no foundation in inter-
national
which had never been perfected by subsequent ffective
occupation"
. 59/
-
discovery would yield only an inchoate title
The Clipperton Island case, ubmitted to King
Victor Emmanuel 111 of Italy by France and Mexico in 1909
ihvoived a dispute over sovereignty to-Clipperton Island,
barren, unoccupied coral reef situated approximately one
thousand miles off the west coast of Mexico .
Mexico contended that the island had originally
been discovered by Spanish navigators and belonged to Mexico,
as successor to Spain partly because of the papal bull which
divided the New World between Spain and Portugal .
	
The
Mexican government produced a chart allegedly showing the
island being under Spanish sovereignty . The arbitrator
considered, however, that the chart lacked official character,
since there was no evidence that had been made by direction
erformed
no positive acts relating the island, relied solely
on its right as successor in title to Spain .
France, on the other hand, had in November, 1858,
claimed the island through a symbolic act of annexation performed
by a visitin French naval officer . Annexation was followed
by notification of French sovereignty to the world, notably
the Hawaiian journal The Polynesian on December 8, 1858 .
h same year, Napoleon 111 granted a concession to a
of the Spanish government .
49
Mexico had, apparently,
private individual to exploit guano beds on the island, but
without any results . There were in fact, no further French
acts, or acts by any other state, manifesting animus occupandi
over the island for many years . Towards the end of 1897, three
persons collecting guano on the island raised the American flag
on the approach of a French vessel . After enquiry by France,
however, the United States disclaimed any intention of claiming
the island . Shortly afterwards, Mexican gunboat La Democrata
landed a detachment of marines, ordering off the three inhabitants
and hoisting the Mexican flag .
	
learning of the incident,
France reasserted its claim to Clipperton Island and, after
protracted diplomatic negotiations, agreed to refer the
matter to the arbitration of the King of Italy .
In deciding in favour of France, the Italian monarch
spoke of the conditions necessary to reduce a'territorium
nulli o the possession of a claimant state :
It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage
having the force of law, besides the animus
occupandi, the actual, and not the nominal,
taking of possession is a necessary condition
of occupation. This taking of possession
consists in the act, or series of acts, . by
which the occupying state reduces to its
possession the territory in question and
takes steps to exercise exclusive authority
there . Strictly speaking, and in ordinary
cases, that only takes place when the state
establishes in the territory itself an
organization capable of making its laws
respected . But this step is, properly speaking,
but a means of procedure to the taking of
possession, and, therefore, is not identical
with the latter . There may also be cases
where it is unnecessary to have recourse to
this method . Thus, if a territory by virtue
of the fact that it was completely uninhabited
from the first moment when the state makes
its appearance there, ;; at the absolute and
undisputed disposition of that state, -from that
moment the taking of possession must be-con-
sidered as accomplished, and the occupation
thereby completed
.61/
6 / Clipperton, 393-94
Accordingly,
	
1897 Clipperton Island was no longer a
ter.fitorium nullius, but was effectively under the
occupation of France . In the absence of serious adverse
claims, French annexation followed by notification in
1858, coupled_ with a continuing intention to occupy the
islan was sufficient to obtain title . As the arbitrator
said :
. . . .Clipp rton Island was legitimately acquired
by France on November 17, 1858 . There is no
reason to suppose that France has subsequently
lost her right by derelictlo ; since' she never
had the animus of abandoning the island, and
the fact that she has not exercised here
authority : there in a positive manner' does not
imply the forfeiture of an acquisition already
definitively perfected .
62/
A, perusal of the Eastern Greenland Case, sland
f Palmas Case, and the ClippertonIslandCase impels one to
the conclusion that the case of terrae nullius which are
either uninhabited or sparsely inhabited,' and under the rule
f foreign sovereign power the mode of acquisition of
territory the manifestation of the requisite animus occupandi
is less exact than would be the case with more advanced, or .
more densely populated and politically sophisticated areas .
The above cases should serve as valuable precedents
any litigation disputing Canadian claims in the Arct
since t islands of the Arctic Archipelago were discovered
and explored by British and Canadian . explorers, were desolate
in nature being either uninhabited or sparsely populated, and
under continuous British and Canadian administration
for a lengthy period of time '3/ -
have been
62/ ' Ibid., 394.
63/ - For 'a development of this argument see
infra, chapter three.
the area in the
eignty over it .
declined to
the
American explorer Admiral Roberty Peary supposedly annexed'
the North Pole and the "entire region" for the United States
in 1909, there was never, subsequently, any "occupation
"annexation" holding that 'lice"
Is not subject to national appropriation .
64/
Even before 1909, in the 1870 s and 1880's and during
the Klondike Gold Rush there was some Canadian concern that
the United States might make claims in the Arctic, because of
she large' influx of American prospectors, the vagueness of
national boundaries and the use of American currency
	
legal
tender ; it was though th without effective Canadian counter-
measures, the whole area might acquire a substantially American
h / 1 Hackworth, International Law, 450 ; on
Peary's polar expedition see, inter alia
Neatby, Conquest ofthe Last Frontier,
Athens, Ohio, 1966, 321, ff , and Caswell,
ArcticFrontiers, Norman, Oklahoma, 1956,
chapter nine.
f
Ill ERR TORIAL ISSUES IN THE CANADIAN ARCTIC
the the foregoing cases, a very brief
review of past territor el issues in the Arctic might be
?T.propriate here . It would appear that the only states with
claims adverse to Canada are (a) the United States ; (b) the
Soviet Union (c) Norway, and (d) Denmark .
The Ame-1i.can Presence in the Arctic
In the case of the United States, although'
sense of a firm intention to exercise sover-
The American government has, moreover,
endorse Peary's
52 -
character, which could be a prelude to annexation :
T threat from the United States . . stemmed
from the possibility that the United States would
establish de facto jurisdiction over territory
claimed but not effectively ; occupied by Canada .
The first instance was in the 18701s and 1880's
when it became apparent that the mosteactiv '
traders and prospectors in the Yukon were United
States citizens ., In 1896 William Ogilvie
reported to the Canadian government on the
situation in the Yukon and suggested thatsome
currency be sent to the Yukon partly in order
to provide a medium of exchange more satisfactory
tlnan gold dust, but also because it "would emphasize
the existence of Canada ." He added that "what
65/
coin and bills are here are largely American .!'--
Should the ; United States have annexed the Yukon, of course.,
it could easily have extended its territorial claims
sparsely settled areas to the East, cutting off land access
to the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and placing the future
political status of the Arctic, in doubt .. Under such conditions,
"effective occupation" of the Archipelago by Canada would have
been virtually impossible . .
A further and more recent instance of American penet-
ration of the North constituting an incipient threat to Canadian
sovereignty occurred with the establishment of joint American
Canadian radar and defence installations after the Second World
War . As Rea says : " . . . .Although thesemeasures were themselves
Rea The PoliticalEconomyoftheCanadian
North, Toronto, 1968, 53, .(hereinafter
cited as Rea)'.
i itiated out of fear o-
	
s i i t UL on North Americ,
they led to some concern in Canada when, a number of
occasions, it appeare that jurisdic. to U
acilitioa lccat- onStates euthoritie over ersonnel and
Canadian territory . -- Concern also ai_f
douse Commons when an American odic rred
Ellesmere Island as 1. -,-1 -.orth r_
T+he 'an~.aian In in el Islam;
the case the Soviet she possibili
incipient
controversy cl
. not even reach the diplomatic fo°r~i
Vilhjal.mur Stefansson, n American, 1)22 urged that the
island be claimed by Britain or Canada, view of its ossible
future importance ass a polar air base,
interest was shown by either country in the proposal
.
repiyi a query by the Leader of the Opposition on ray 12
1922, while placing before the House estima es to pay e aaenses
G Graham,
Minister of Militia and Defence, said : ". . . .at the present time
Stefansson
of the recent Stefansson expedition expedition), Ho
the Canadian flag flying on Wrangel Island, and there are
Canadians on th , island members of a previous expedition of
government certainly maintains
the position that Wran Island t of the property this
country .
6
-- Government interest the island dwindled however
6 / Rea, 53, thorities cited there fn. 1.16,
and see' Allen, "Will the Dewline Cost Canada its North-
1-and?" in Maclean's ii.agazi,ne;, May 26, 1956,
. nd ?tasters
Canada In World Affairs, 1953-56 (C.I )Toronto,
1959, 65-67 .
6 / R. 53-54.
68/ Riddell, Documen, on C r : than Fc:reinn Policy, 191 7 -
1939,Toronto, 1962, 743, see also 1 Fiaclcworth,
International_ Law, 464.
and as Baird mentions, it was impo
send a relief party to succour the
Siefansson had left there, only one of whom was ultimately found
alive . Further Alaskan Kskimos placed on the island by
Stefansson Yere removed forcibly by a Soviet vessel in 192
possession of tine Soviet Union .
would seem that Canadian and Soviet Arctic c
far from being conflicting, should be mutually supportir .
Together, the Soviet Union and Canada occupy more
of the A,,W
tes combined . They
have both an6erO,
"sector" claims, which are
similar in prince e,1 and if GanaVa
makes claims to northern wators and ice it could cita Russian
practice as a precedent . A would he a contradiction
sector principle for
Canada or the Soviet Union to dispu0z
territory in the adjoining sector,
since the principle implies
reciprocity among arctic states
. To . act in such a way would
call into question the legitimacy of
the sector prOciple itself .
Canada, in addition, is in . the highly unusual position that
whereas it
could rely on Soviet support for its Arctic claims on
.
	
r
the basis of reciprocity, it could also
suggest Lo the United
States that such an understanding with the U
.S .S .R . was in the
mutual interest
of Canada and the United States for . defensive
the case
	
Norway, putative Norwegian claim
the Sverdrup Isl n s was •e ttled 1930 when the Canadian
vernment paid the Norwegian explorer Captain Otto Sverdrup
7,000 in recognition of his services in ;exploring "Sverdrup
Islands the northernmost portion of the Arctic Archipela 70/
The Danish nteres in Ellesmere Island
In 1.920, the government of, Denmark contended that
Ellesmere Island, which was situated between the Danish possession
of Greendland and the remainder of the Canadian Arctic Arch -i
pelago was a' colony of neither Denmark . nor Canada, but ter
nulliuis . Fairl_ey describes the genesis of th'e dispute
. .The ; Danish explorer Knud Rasmussen, visiting
Smith Sound, had indulged in some big-scale musk-
ox hunting on Ellesmere Island, and
wwhen the
Canadian government complained that he had not
obtained permission he, said' he considered the
whole region north of Parry Channel to be a
no-man's-land, as indeed it appeared on most
non-British maps, in April 1920-the Danisn
government endorsed his view . 7!/
view
in a' letter to Stefansson: " as every one knows the land
the polar Eskimo falls under w is called;"no-man's-land"
7 / Hackworth, International-Law, 465, and see
Beriault,, LesProblemes Politique :=~ du Nord
Canadien, Universite d'Ottawa, 1942 103-104,
hereinafter cited as Beriault) .
/ Fairley, Sverdrup's ArcticAdventures London,
1959, 278.
and there
	
herefore no authority this country except
that whi h I myself am able to exert through the Lrading
station . - rind Rasmussenos view been acquiesced
course
Denmark using G-eenl and as umping off place, create
an infrastructu
would have been a fairly sing) e matter for
governmental authority over e
islands north of Parry Channel, extending t the eastern
Ifrin e "e permanent polar ice .
The Danes themselves, however, were apparently
Fearful that their le to reenland would 'be questioned.,
particularly by Norway 7 l and through dernarche settled
their own a d nada's problems sir,iu . : Usly . On
p , mber, 1920, at the request of Denmark, itisil
government recognized Danish sovereignty over Greenland but
Britain expressly made such recognition' contingent upon. the
right to be consulted advance should Denmark at any time
contemplate the alienation of the island to a foreign power
.
ppears, as Beriault observes, that Denmark quietly
c opped
its
representations on the legal status of Ellesmere Island .
when Br taLn recognized Danish sovereignty over
Greenland.--4/
interesting that during the Second World-'War
the .lies invoked the Danish promise of prior-consultation,
73/ For a brief outline of the Norwegian-Danish
dispute over Greenlan supra., 43-44 .
before alienations to ward off a possible Nazi acquis Lion
Greenland
	
In this connection, rime' Minister Ki said in
the House, fter the I of Denmark
deal only with local Danish administrators on the island,
not with the government in Copenhagen presumed to be under
German control . L
There remains the question whether Canada can assert
title the permanent ice within its sector boundaries as
1V CANADIAN TITLE TO PERMANENT ICE?
7/
Prime Minister Pearson has urged . The vexed question of
national title to glacies firma has been the subject of pro-
tracted inconclusive dispute among international jurists .
Lauterpacht has argued emphatically that sovereignty over polar
ice is not permissible :
When,, in 1909, Admiral Peary reached the
North Pole and hoisted the flag of the United
States,,the question was discussed whether the
North Pole, could be the object of occupation .
The question must, it is believed, be answered
in the negative since there is no land at the
North Pole . 78/
79Scott / and Clute 80/ are in firm agreement with Lauterpacht that
ice not subject to national sovereignty . ; Balch assumes an
75/ Ibid ., 125,
76/ House Commons Debates, 1940, vol .
77/; Vide supra, 34_35 .
78/ Oppenheim, International.Law, Lauterpacht
8th ed ., London, 1955, vol.1, fn 6, 556 .
79/ (1909) 3 A.J.I .L ., 938
80/ (1.927) 5 Can .	Rev., 21.
a intermediate position, contencing that North polar ice
not subject to ownership since it
	
continual motion,
he does not discount the possibi_lit; of immobile ice
being f ctively occupied Other jurists, to greater
lesser de have argued that claims to sovereignty over
91
east some forms ice are permissible .-
Ignori for the moment, comerl ise positions like
th Balc ?e`;a7. opinions concerning sovereignty over
the ice are divided between those who, like the Russian , ist,
assimilate immobile ice 7 ' ' frozen land" and those who, like
Lauterpacht and Oppenheim, regard ice fundamentally as water
and hence not subject appropriation as
the solution to this oblem
dichotomy put forward by Lauterpacht may be inferred from
the following passage describing the physical characteristics
of Antarctica:
. .A more or le ocked ice cap in firm
union with the b drock beneath is, because o f its
origin, probably_ made up' chiefly of frozen fresh
.,cater, or compressed and, transformed snow, not frozen
salt wzltcr . For all practical purposes it is,per-
petually solid as the land-it "sits on" . What in-
dustries or actions of the high seas can be exercised
on and in such a medium . Whether certain portions
f Antartica are shown to be only islands bound together
1/ (1910) 4 A.J.I.L ., 265-266 .
82/ See the authorities cited in 2 Whiteman, er-
national Law, 1226, : such as Rolland, Waltrin (Doliot
Lindley, Lakhtine, Hyde and Smedal all of whom argue
that the frozen ice is "capable' of occupation" . To
these names should be added that of Hayton j see
next footnote .
"territory ."
not to be found in the simple
60
by solid ice or land depressed real
weight of ice, it would seem o, -'r to rt3Cil
the concept of territory to r:ccoifiodate
glacies -irma,"d3 /
js'specia
	
f one accepts the hypothesis t,entioned Cc ; ; to 'c
Antarctica is actually ; a number of island, entities / exhibiting
merely a superficial unity because of the thick ice
1,
the
possibility acquiring property rights in such ice would he
enhanced
. LThat would be the difference, in such circumstances
between appropriating glades firma over land or glades z xu
over what really constitutes frozen seabed? In chemical com-
position, and in almost every conceivable quality and use there
would be -no . distinction in the overlying ice except with regard
to what lay underneath . One might ask, well, what the
difference . would
be' between interior intersti_ial ice linking
together the various hypothetical islands of Antarctica and -ice
overhanging the, sea (ice shelves) along the fringes the
Antarctic Continent?> The possibilities of exploiting the surface
of the ice over the sea would be virtually identical with the
possibilities ice in . the interior over land . Indeed, f "exploit-
"durability" and "permanence"
are among ; the prerequisites for
appropriating the terrestrial
would find it difficult to make a valid distinction
"ice and "land For many purposes, and disregarding
/ Hayton, "The Antarctic Settlement of 1959,
(1959) 54 A.J .I . fn . 56, 360 .
84/ For =a discussion, to similar ffect the
Greenland ice sheet, t The Arctic
Basin, (revised editio
for the moment chemical properties, the distinctio would bu
more one of degree than of kind.' The polar ice at the north
e exhibits essentially the same properties, except that
in motion . At o h poles, the geological effect of
compression over many centuries coupled with a negligible
rate of evaporation have produced a solid mass of material,
which for many purposes, can be assimilated to land, and
which permanent structures can be built with an expectation
of stability and durability over long periods of time .
is true however that the "ice shelve
	
around
the periphery_ of Antarctica are moving-slotiwrly, and mobility
is sometimes said to be a hindrance to the appropriation
a surfacearea by a state . "Territory" that moves, for one
thing, cannot easily be identified ; it will permit only
certain kinds of activity on its surface and structures built
on it may be unstable . Without pressing the analogy
it might be argued that certain land forms also display in-
stability and still, as long as they constitute "land", are
subject to ownership .' The most dramatic illustration of this
perhaps,_is .the old Continental Drift theory, which recently
O 1 -
are of volcanic origin ; developing deltas around the
of great riverslike the Nile and Mississippi,
subsiding beneath the
pack ice, these 1
instability, but they
has received strong geological confirmation, and which indicates
that whole continents are in a state of slow but continual
motion. Other examples areislands like the Galapagos,' which
mouths
lowly
sea like much of Western Europe . Like
tructures display a certain amount
can easily sustain most human activities .
Considerations like these suggest that a more functional .
test than the present essentially chemical one night be
devised as a criterion for the appropriation o ;: the earth's
surface . Surely, the, researches of historical geologists
over the past century have tai.
	
us not to invest land,
which is subject to alternate elevation and inundation.
as a result of various ecostatic pressures (the :arctic
basin is rising, for instance, and may one day be land)
with excessive . structural stability .
Much research has been carried out on Antarctic
ice shelves, particularly during the last two decades . One
research which may be
law of the sea :
85/ Baird 282 .
86/ Ibid ., loc. ct .
of the largestprotruding shelves,'t'he Ross Shelf, advances
seaward at a rate of about one-third of a mile per year . ~5~
Icebergs form continually at the outer edges of such shelves,
some of them " . . .tens of miles in linear dimension and many
hundreds of feet thick ." $~'/ Baird summarizes some of the
of particular significance for the ,
. . . .On the Ross ice
shelf,. in the neighbourhood
of little America, many : studies have been carried
out in the various years when it has been occupied
and in 1958-59 American glaciologists drilled
practically; through the shelf, 836 feet out of an
estimates 850 feet thickness . They found, somewhat
to their surprise, no trace of sea ice in the drill
core, thus providing evidence against the
theory that some ice shelves g roar from
accretion from below. The Ross Shelf at
Little America consist,,,, of something
like 1,200 years accumulated ;now pres ;,en
by its own weight into plastic ever s-,, : c-din,;
ice, the yearly addition s .ng some t hi n,
2.0 centimetres (8 inches .) of water
	
valent .
.ln appreciation of the origin i-e shelve y as ahoy
might prompt a reconsideration o,_ some of e theorizin,
maritime: lawyers on the limits of the _te ton al :a in pola -
Colombos for example argues :
The question has often been rats as -o , hether,
in case the sea is frozen, the sovereignty of .the
riparian state extends to the limits of the ice
forming a continuous pack fromthe shore, without
taking 'into consideration -the normall limits of
the territorial . sea„ Toadmit the affirmative
absolutely is. to give to States, especially in
the Polar regions, an excessive maritime bel
as ice pack may assume immense .proportions .
)-- /
but from a rel tively id and stable accretion of great :
Without attempting to - controvert what Colombos says, one might
ask whether his conclusion would be the same if he realized
ice shelves at the edges of both polar ice
not, in fact "frozen sea" as lie states, but accumulated sno ,/r,
subject to very little seasonal evaporation,- and hardening in
layers through pressure over long periods of time . It is
submitted that the fact that a ate was not, in such a case,
delimiting its offshore boundaries from "solidified sea water
caps were
compactness ) orrmed wh
o lly
on land and only subsequently mova
out
	
sea could make' a difference in his conclusion . if ore
took 1 ice shelf of such composition .extetiding, as is not
a more
boundaries
ice shelves
of Green
may
uncommon twenty miles out to sea, the leading edge
advanced very slowly forming iceber ,,s, but any seaward loss
being made up by the movement of other ce from the interior,
the whole formation would have a relatively stable aspect .
One would be dealing here normally with l ;. .e hundreds of feet:
thick and of great density . When all these geographical facts
are considered, it is suggested that one could make
cogent argument than that of Colombos that offshore
,could be delimited from prominent ice shelves . The
in the Arctic, which are, formed mainly to the north
land and E' lesmere Island, are essentially similar to those
in Antarctica . Baird speculates that the very thick . and almost
stationary Ellesmere Island ice shelf, fron which most Atlantic
ice islands originate must have formed in situ over several'
thousand years .-
While conceding that the forty-five mile, long Ward
Hunt Ice Shelf to the north of Ellesmere Island has been
stagnant since 1964-65, Pharand considers that in view of its
"disintegration" through time " . . .it would be somewhat unreal-
istic for Canada assimilate the remaining ice shelves to
land' in the measurement of its territorial belt ."~Q~ One
89/ Baird, 69 .
90/ Pharand, "The Legal Status of Ice Shelves and,
Ice Islands in the Arctic," (1969) LesCahiers
de Droit, 467 .
11
edges
	
e shelves, and still argue territorial waters
should, some manner, be delimited outtiia .ds from them .
adopt his position in an unc;ualitied sense would signify at
65 -
ec with Pharand that there
the "territorial belt" &Ion, much of
northern
Ellesmere
would ctually be drawn under thigh permanent ices One
argue that, on his -.orical_ grounds, two functions : for
territorial belt -was created were :
(b) the regulation of n<avi
some instability
:on adjacent to national coast-
outer
lines, with-( being the predominant original consider !on .
If one were, in fact, to delimit territorial waters Chr-_
coastline, rather than from the ice shelves, which often
trude seawards for twenty miles or more ram the neap - e t land
)
it would mean that the littoral 'state would have no jurisdiction
to regulate shipping in hazardous areas where regulation may
become increasingly necessary in the future . It would also
mean that potential enemies could' establish military in-, L 1
ations on overhanging ice shelves without infringing ion<i
sovereignty, thus acquiring a-vital area of lodgement appurt-
enant t national territory as a base of military operations
If factors like the above are persuasive one could
claim the permanent ice or ice shelf as '!territory in order
to extend outward from t the belt of territorial . waters . This
would essential both for ensuring safe navigation and for
defensive purposes. At a minimum, surely "seasonal" claims
ght be entertained . ,skimos utilize the shore ice for
hunti , and frequently establish camps on the edges of the
ice sheets. If, as Pharand rightly asserts, there is some
instability at the outer fringes of ice shelves, such
area of instability is still very small in comparison
the linear dimension of the shelves taken as a whole . To meet
subject has developed only since 1945, when President Truman
made his celebtated proclamation claiming the continental
	
elf
appurtenant to the United States . Sinceo that time, many nations
have made similar claims, and . an . 'internaLlonai Convention,—~'
on the subject has ome into operation 92/
In the North Sea ContinentalShelfCases,
90
. a OU sn to
arose between Denmark and the Netherlaids on the one hand and the
The Convention came- into e fe t on 10 June, 19(
when the 22 ratifications or accessions required
for that purpose by Arttcl_e' l:1 had been received,
see (1969) twJ .I .L . 6Q5 . -
- 66
his objections, it would be necessaL in such cases to ma-e
stall-adjustment - by en i.e ndLnC the u It territorial waters
seaward. from strait ii t baselines defining the area where the-
configuration of the ice shelves had been stable for decades
or centuries this,' need be no Pore cumbersome than many (Lher
complicated baseline systems .
V THE CANADIAN CLAIM TO THE ARCTIC CON'i:INEN:LAL 3nM'
When' one . considers the extent of Canadian title to
the subsoil of the Arctic continental shelf, it is difficult
to make a definitive judgment because the L v itself' has not
yet crystallized . it should be remembered that th law on tits
91/ The Convention on the' Continental Shelf Geneva., $
a98 499UN Teat Srie 311 (1958)
5 see . .ryes, ; ,
92/
52 A . J, • ., 5
93/ See North , a Continental Shelf . Cases (fc crai
Republic of Germany-Denmark ; Federal Feuub '(_
Germany-Netherlands) I .C .J. Reports, .1.969, see
the majority opinion (the court dividing
the cases were consolidated) in (1969) 63 A t .1:. . ,
591-636, (the :n ;ar_i Ly opinion referred to t bee
cited hereinafter as NorthSea Case) .
shelf .
f
Federal epublic of Germany on
. the other concerning
Danish-Dutch apportionment )
in such a way as to curtail the Federal Rcpuo
	
rare the
de Iirniti _,g Canadian share of the Arctic continental sliel
they should summarized here . :although the pCCi is applic lion
the facts are not complex and may be set opt briefly .
0 December let 1.964, and June 1965, agreements
were entered into between the Federal Re ubl,c, the Netherlands
and Denmark extending their submarine boundaries f sor, .e miles
offshore accordli the principle' of 'equidis'tance" . An
6'7
suggested
the North Sea eonti ental shelf
Since the general principles enunciated by the Inter-
Justice this case might be -,-applied in
_nciples enunciated by :she ny be di_fficu
equidistance boundary line was defined in the jud-nent as ine
.which leaves to each of the parties concerned all those
portions of the continental shelf that are nearer a point on
its own coast than they are to any point on the coast f the
9 /other party ." The seaward- boundaries arrived at by t e foregoing
agreements, however, did not . exhaustively
delirnit'the respective
shares of the shelf of _ the three states' as they never converged,
extending merely for some miles out, to sea . Further negotiation
between the parties on the und.elimited portion of . the shelf proved
fruitless . The Netherlands and Denmark wanted the "equ 4. distance
principle" referred to in Article 6 of the . Convention applied
throughout. If this were done because of theirr convex, bulging
coasts and the concave or recessing German coastline wedged
between them,. their respective shares of the helf would be
enhanced at German expense .- The Federal Republic which unlike
Denmark and the Netherlands had signed Out not yet ratified the
Convention, contended that the 'eq'idistance" principl although
referred to in the Convention, was not a customary rule of
international law, -nd was not bindingupon the Federal .
r ued that in the absence of
binding conventional rules, each coastal
. state was entitled
to
	
just and equitable share" cE the appurtenant continental
shelf . Instead ojecti g equidistant boundaries seaward
by straight lines between the concave German North Sea sho,
line and those of the other rt:ies, with the inevitable
result that the boundaries would meet a relatively short
distance offshore, the Germans argued that some other method
should be applied
. A more enuitable solution, according
Federal Republic, would be to extend the water boundaries
out -to the median line demarcating the shelf boundary between
the United Kingdom, the proprietor of 'the western North Sea
shelf, and those of its continental neighbours who owned the
more easterly portion . The shallowness of most of the North
Sea meant that almost all of it would be subject to national
appropriation . If this alternative method were applied, Germany
would receive a much larger pie-like wedge of continental shelf
tapering out, to the boundary of the English shelf, instead of
the more severely compressed triangle it would receive
the equidistance principle .
The Court found that the Federal Republic was not
obligated to apply the equidistance principle in delimiting
its portion of the continental shelf . It had never ratified
the Convention, the invoked principle was not . a. customary rdle o
international law, but merely one of several possible methods
used to demarcate maritime boundaries . The : contention of Denmark
and the Netherlands, moreover, that the Federal Republic had
impliedly acquiesced Article 6 and the equidistance principle
by various acts was not accepted byy the Court. The Court
attached great weight to the consideration that as soon as
the concrete delimitations of the North Sea continental
shelf areas under the said method became apparent, the
95/
position-once reserved
Instead of what might be called the mathematical
concept of "equidistance", the Court',put forward as more
appropriate the geographical concept of the natural extension
or prolongation of the claimant statets .land territory .
Since this concept is especially significant in relation to
Canadian claim to the continental shelf adjacent'' to the
Arctic Archipelago, the relevant judicial formulation
quoted in extet so :'
More fundamental than the'notion .o
proximity appears to be the principle --
constantly relied upon by all the parties
of the natural prolongation' or continuation of
the land terrtitory or domain, or land sovereignty
of the coastal state, into and under the high seas,
via the bed, of the territorial sea which is under
the full sovereignty of that St8te . There are
various ways
of formulating this principle, but the
underlying idea, namely of an extension of something
already possessed,,is'the same, and :it is this idea'
of extension which is, in the Court's opinion,
determinant . Submarineareas do not really appertain
to the-coastal. state because --- or not only because---
they are near it . They are near, it of course ; but
this would not suffice to confer title, any more
than, according to a well established principle
law recognized by both sides in the present case,
mere proximity confers per se title to land territory.
What confers. the ipso jure,title which international
law ^ttributes to the Coastal State in respect of its
is
a result of the above reasoning, the Court rdvised the parties
continental shelf, is the fact that the ubmarinc areas
concerned limy be deemd `to be actually part of the
territory over -v?hich the coasLa1 Staac alrcaci - as
dominion,---
	
the sense, that, although covered
with water, nney are - o on a on or co -. -I ti_nua Lion
of -that to -r -, itoryon e aens; under cl -: 50-1 .
Fron; this would follow tc henever you
submarine
(7-1 "1 does not coy rya
or the I tatural exteo-Is .,on (--
territory o- the coastal state s even L
territory may be closer to it than
the
territory of any other State, it canno
regarded ~'-n the face of a competing claim by a State
of whose 1-c,.nd territory the submarine are cc icr:.rned
is to be re
;>arded as a natural extension,' even i
it is less close to it .
96
1-
/0 -
reement on their respective shares of the shelf,
not on the basis of "equidistance," but taking into account,
for each Party (among other factors), all those parts
the continental shelf
that constitute a natural prolongation of
i land territory into and under he sea, without encroachment
I
on the natural prolongation of land territory of, the other . . . ~ c~ I
In cases of overlap, the area should be divided between negotiating
states in agreed proportions or equally, and such features a the
general configuration - of-the coasts, physical . and geological
structure, natural resources and "a reasonable degree of prop-
ortionality," (in relation t the length
coast, measured
the general directionof the coastline") should be-considered .=
)
-
96/ ldorth sea case, 6 0-611 .
/ Ibid .' $ 631 .
98/ ibid ., loc . cit .
b
e :3O
beyond the
99/ Article 1 reads as follows : .
For the purpose of these Articles the term
tconti.nental shelf' is used as referring ( )
to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of the territorial. sea, to a
depth of
200, metres or, beyond that limit, to where
the depth of the superjacent waters admits
of the exploitation of the natural resources
of the s-iid areas ; (b) to the seabed and
subsoil. of similar submarine areas
adjacent .
to the coasts of islands .
100/ Cf . Mouton, The Continental Shelf,
The Hague,
1952, 20-ff .
A refreshing aspect of the forego :.
	
judgment e ices
in its realistic approach to the problem of, defining the
limits of
the continental shelf The two-hundred metre depth
9 9 /
referred to in Article
1 of, the Convention+- is not inve_;ted
where they are no longer exploitable
with magical significance' but is
used a ong th the den
submarine topography to determine the
extent the national
shelf . It would certainly
conflict with geography f
i
sloping submarine contour, constituting a nations continental
shelf, were arbitrarily cut off precisely at
the two-hundred
metre depth.
100/
Even the Article mentioned conjoins the
two-hundred -metre
rule to the complementary principle
"exploita:bility"
. If, natural resources are exploithl)lc
two-hundred metre depth, apparently a patio
al
claim to the continental shelf
is maintainable to the point
or
reasonable distance . The Article is not
exhaustive or precise,
but a' provision
of universal application cannot hope to be . .
It is of interest, nonetheless, that the Article expressly
removing
Archipelago .
Before proceedia Lo examine t
	
iossible cone
- ation of Lhe archioel,apic shed.
islanc -houl he emphasized that the 1969 North
damn y the World Court is at most a guide, chat
Line
,drincip
enunciated
tlhier.ein, because of their ; specific
European context, should generalized wi ution. The
attempt by the Court to envi co the shelf as a concrete
reality, ho:;ever, and to eschew, as far as poss-
purely abstract mathematical rules, is very convincin-_
likely ; that such a common sense approach would
other geographical contexts . Such ai approach
promotes desirable is ilochement'of legal and scientific
concep will be attempted, therefore, briefly to' apply,
this reasoning to the Canadian Arctic . while conceding that,
because the -till unsettled condition of the law, any
definitive appraisals. i s premature .
initial difficulty facing the jurist attemptin
apply continental shelf law to the Arctic is that until
recentl~- the submarine topography of the region was unknown .
A formidable obstacle was the thick covering of permanent ice
which obscured much of the Artic sea_' floor until technological
innovations enabled scientists to penetrate it . It vas only
in 1948, for example, that Gakkel discovered the Lomonossov
Ridge, a huge underwater formation extending across the molar
seas from the New Siberian Islands to the vicinity of Ellesmere
Island . Baird describes this formation " . ., . averages
geographical
ible,
It is most u
be abandoned
72
purports extend its provisions to "islands , thereby
doubt of its application to the Canadian
about 1,300 metres below sea level and thus is over 2,5 0 metres
101 / The
four degrees
."high with slopes up to twee
Would
	
ar resemble a subme-geu mountain ; of considerable
-ins some three thousand to four ou sand-metres in to .
The larger American basin extends from i s off . the nor=h:rn
coast 01 1 ska to the Lomonossov Rid bordering the western
ie Canadian Arctic Archip
go
. On the other side
the e smaller but deeper Burns an Basin extend from
the neighbouVhood of Greenland and the Spitsbergen islands
101
the northwester" Siberia The perimeters of these b
are si nificont i demarcntin- the absolute limits of any
realistic continental shelf ims in the Arctic .
Along the western fr,nge of the Archipelago, deep
extensions the American basin, resembling underwater c yon
penetr to
considerable depths between carious of the Canadian
Arctic islands,
tuated on either side
One such projection in Amundsen Gulf, south of
L iBanks Island ranges in depth from just over 400 metres
eastern edge to an extreme of around800 metres at the pe .Lineter
the Beaufort Sea . Another l=inger-like puaJection peg etrati_n .-,
McClure Strait and Viscount Melville Sound consistently reaches
depths ; of more than 500 metres ., There are projections of
depths between the Sverdrup Islands just of Ellesmere ani .
The Baffin Basin, midway between Baffin slain and .Greeniand,
is much deeper, reaching depth in excess of 2,000 metres over
much of its area . 103 It is extremely unlikely that any i
age
the Ridge are deep polar
or-
national tribunal would hold that any of the for oing regions
of the Arctic could form appurtenances of the Canadian continental
shelf the Arctic . This signifies that perforce the Canadian
101/ Baird,
102/ xii d see the diagram of the basins 92-9
103/ See Hydrographic Chart 7000, Arctic Islands,
(Davis Strait to Beaufort Sea including Connecting,
Passages 1970 Canadian Hydrographic Service .
and
shelf will be indented b numerous projections along much o its
perimeter,
Because the as yet uncompleted geological exploration
of the Archipela
with the judgment
tific judgments
full
	
eo1_.ogical
still
require many further years of study .
possible to say, in conformity
the North SeaCa-•e, iQ4/ that the whole Archi-
pelago (wi -th the adjacent underwater areas) h s a geological
structure 1.i.ilar to thei mainland .- Many of the Eastern Arctic'
Islands, however, like the greater Par , - of Eastern Canada, are
underlain by rocks of the rich, mineral-bearing Pre-Cambrian
Shield . Protrusions of this . geological "basement" have appeared
similar geological formations on the Arctic mainland of Canau
vening seabed is similar, still, of course, premature to
make any but the broadest generalizations on the subject, and
for the presentwriter it would be pretentious to make
any scien-
all . If, as it is thought, the Arctic islands
and adjacent submarine areas were once part of the
mainland, their
geological similarity with nearby parts of Canada would
not be
surprising . Since many of the islands have produced evidence of
three great'orogenic movements, and complicated', layers of sedi-
mentary and volcanic materiall overlay baserock in most areas, and
since areas covered by thick ice have not yet been explored, the
analysis of the arctic continental shelf will
not
on eastern Devon and Ellesmere Island on Boothia Peninsula,
Somerset Island, and elsewhere in the .Archipelago . 10 5 / Much
the explored areas on the islands appear to be outcrops or extrusions
of
104/ Vide supra, 6 and NorthSeaCase, 6 .
105/ Baird, 183-183 .,
106/ See any good geological map, e .g . , Geologic.nll
Man of the Arctic, (Alberta Society . . of
Petroleum Geologists), 1960 .
exploration may be, however
there is that the orchipela
unitary aspec
it would seer
shelf is
Lrom what e
7 en
tcii to the mainl ?''
and the various environing islands . The whole Archipe
	
o
its cons another
10
lenent connection stresses in the North "Case
closely G, Canadian mainland . 1'herc are no ascertainable
sharp cleavages between geological .fort ,lions in explore&
f the islandsand the mainland althouth there are 'deep u ,n. er-
water "canyons" around the perimeter of Archipelago,
breaking up the evenness of the more compact central she . and a
more reasoned,juagment awaits further study .
It will be . attempted, n the final chapter,'; to evaluate
Canadian claims to the Arctic Archipelago on the basis of t
arts
e
foregoing legal considerations. Before this task is attempted
however, a more detailed examination
Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic
ways in necessary .
the ) c chapter,
certain
"d<,iers
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CILtPTEN THREE
CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVAR THE ARCTIC !SARK
general in,
of archipelagoes, as it relates to Arctic -territory, was
_r some of the associated problems, such as the degree
Vide supr
necessary to manifest
oroceedi a discussion of the legal r ime applicable
polar waters the next chapter, the more specific indicia or.
C-nadian title to the archipelaci_c islands will be surveyed .
names
dormaendi, were- -11
fairly extensive literature now exists on
polar lands .-
-58 .
i iotiC> a .l
exami, ad ,
control
soverei r+- over the
Vide supra- 42-51
3/ See e„g., Balch he rctic and Antarctic Regic;
and the Law of, Nation&, (1.910) 4 J )-2 . ;
Breitfuss, 11Territorial Division of the Arc ic,
(1929) DalhousieReview, 456-470 ; Dollot, Droit
- ternationai des Espaces Polaires,' (l940) de
Recueil, 117-194 ; Hayton Polar Problems and ter-
national Law," (1958) 52 W.I .L. 746-766 ead,
"Canadian Claim to Territorial Sovereignty in the
Arctic Region (1963), 9 McGill W . 200-266 ; Hyde,
"Acquisition Sovereignty over Polar yeas (1_934)
19 Iowa L .R . 286-294 ; Inch, An EHarnination of Canada's
Claim to Sovereighty in the Arctic," (1962) 1 Manitoba
S .J ., 31-53 ; Lakhtine, "Rights over the Regions
and international. Law, ," (1947) 1 1 .1, 54-58 ; Smedal,
Acquisition of Sovereignty over Polar Areas , 1931 .
Lindley, in a classic work, set-out ;the essential
requirements for obtaining sovereignty over uninhabited lands
e case of uninhabited lands which are n t suit
	
e
for settlement requires special consideration, It has
been suggested, for example, that the North Polar regions
have a thigh strategic value,' and that Wrangel Island
and other islands in the Arctic Ocean might contain
minerals, or be of use as aircraft bases, ;or fur
purposes of wireless telegraphy, or in connection
with the Arctic fisheries .
In such cases, it would seem that an occupation
would be rendered effective by the establishment of any
organization (however rudimentary) . or of any system of
control, which, having regard to the condittns'under,
which the area appropriated was being used or was likely
to be used, was reasonably sufficient to maintain or_ier
among such persons, as might resort there .
Again small uninhabited islands are sometimes
occupied for some special or temporary purpose, such as
the collection of phosphate or guano, . or the exploitation
of the fishery . Here also - no elaborate machinery is
called for, and the presence of an official may be all
that is reasonably required to ensure that order is
//
maintained among the workpeople and othersemployed there„-'
Although, as Lindley indicat an elaborate physical presence in
the territory is. not necessary, there must be an administration
which purports to exercise exclusive authority within its bound-
aries . The primary functions of such : an authority consist of t e
protection of life and property, the administration of law and
military defence . may be that in certain parts of the territory,
Lindley, ackward Territory in International
New York, 1969, 158, (originally published
1926) .
these, functions will rarely or never be invoked but-their mere
availability,, to the exclusion of'competii
	
thorities may
be sufficient to constitute the display of power needed for
sovereignty . Some of these, rules reflect the colonial herita
of European powers, . and their application in areas where d'
colo :izaLion is in progress might be placed in controversy,
especially they were used to rationalize the continuance of
'imperial
.' control .s.5/ As all. of the conceivable rival . ciazm at :
of Canada's rctic territory, however, are Western powers,
; this
issue has never really arisen in the context-of the Arctic Archi-
pelago
.
As_Lindley argues, a definite co-relation will exist
between the demographic, economic' and political characteristics
f a dependent or remote territory . and theadministrative structure
needed to, assert effective control and thereby claim sovereignty
over it. Where the population is sparse or non-existent, very
little will suffice to manifest effective control
. But as
. the .
population of the hinterland grows, as the economy becomes more
productive and the people acquire political sophistication,
more elaborate governmental infrastructure is neededil More
recently, Schwarzenberger has expressed' the same idea
5/ The international legal rules for the acquisition
'backward" or unoccupied- territory derive in
part from the Berlin Conference of 1884 which
codified the rules respecting the European colon-
ization of Africa
. Article 3 5 of Chapter V7I of
the Berlin Act, for example, reas as follows :
"The signatory Powers of the present
.  Act recognize
the obligation to insure the establishment (l'existence
in the French text) of authority in the regions
occupied_ by them on the coasts of the African
continent sufficient to protect existing rights
(droi.ts acquis) and, as the case may be, freedom of
trade and transit under the conditions agreed o
(See Lindley,
.op
.cit ., 144 .)
6/ Lindley,   p
.cit .  159.
r Lfecti.ve occupation manifests itself
the est ;ablishment of adequate state machinery
and the actual display of state jurisdiction.
The ae3ree of effectiveness :,equired varies with
circumstances, such as the
Size
of the territory,
tile exxLe'nt to which it is i - habited, as ii-, deserts
or polar regions, and even climatic conditions .
rind althoug LindleY wrote
	
1926 before the Palmas (1926) and
tasteri eun"ianti 1933 decisions,- ann chwarzenberger
`teraards and Schwarzenberger was, of course influence;!
1
these decisions), in combination such decisions and writi_-.',,s
indicate a strong current of law in support
enunciate .
In a the effective occupancy the Canadian
North depends upon exploration, administration and settlement b;
Great Britain, Canada can establish a title going back some four
Three yews after Confederation, in 1870 (as discuss
.in'chapter one) t1-,e title that part of the Arctic claimed by
Britain was transferred to Canada . Initially, the area was
North-T:'est Council and the Lieutenant-Governor of
Manitoba, the_' seat of government being Winnipeg .
localNorth-West Territories Act-
,
was establishing
administration under resident lieutenant-governor .g/'Until 1905,
term North-West i'err Ties included the prairie region between
Manitoba and British Columbia, as well as the more northern
Schwarzenberger, .A Manual of International Law
4th ed., . London,, 1.960, vol . 1 115 ;.
8/ Vide supra, 43 ff .
9/ 38 V (1875
-
80,
territories . Provision was made, for the evolution
	
this immense
region to self-governing status when there were sufficient numbers
f non-alien whites-to - constitute 21 electoral ., district
each
having at least 1,000 personswithin an area of 1,000s
:Euare miles .
In 1888, the first Legislative Assembly was set up with 2 members
.
.In 1897 the territory acquired responsible government, the
executive being held accountable to the legislature and
compelled
to resign after an adverse vote on a major issue . The Legislature
still lacked, however borrowing' powers or local control of natural
resources,, Between 1891 and 1901 the population grew from 98,967
to 165,555 and because of increasing settlement, 1905 the areas
below the 60th parallel of north latitude were transformed into
provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta . Henceforward, the terra
"North-West Territories", had narrower and more specific
connotation . In 1898, the Yukon was created a separate territory
with a form of non-responsible government, having a Commissioner
and six appointed councillors . After many ~han.ges in the nature
of its
. territorial government, in 1960 some measure of responsible
government was established in the Yukon . I that year, it was
provided that the Commissioner would consult with a representative
committee in preparing financial estimates . 1
The Yukon has a relatively more centralized form
government than the Northwest Territories, the latter region'
being governed largely from Ottawa .-;-'l ~ A division of powers between
the territories and the federal government exists however, with
the enumerated subject-matters being not dissimilar
of
those set
out in Articles 91 and 92 of the BritishNorth America Act. In the
Yukon, the Commissioner-in-Council can egislate on such matters
as direct taxatio
	
the incorporation of local companies,
marriage intoxican hospital roads and other local matters~:2 /
the Northwest Territories, the legislative pokers of the
Commissioner Council are essentially the
same.
Throughout
the 1950Vs both territories, the respective councils were
dominated by appointed members with the federal government re-
taming the n-major voice in the formulation of policy. In the
1957-58 session of Parliament the borrowing position of the North-
west Territories was enhanced when it was allowed to borrow money
for locall purposes, and to lend money to municipalities and local
school districts ; similar financial powers had existed for some
time i the Yukon.
An examination the
despite recent increases, the population
is among the smallest the world for an area of its size and
that economic development in the region has, been correspondingly
s low,
While population declined after the Klondike Gold Rush
of 1897-98, from a total of 47,300 in 1901 to 12,300 in 1921 and
thence rose slowly to 37 600 in 1961, the area remains one of the
most sparesely populated in the world . More substantial recent
increases in population are attributable partly to a fall in the
death rate amounting to about 50 per cent in the period 1940-60,,
relevant figures indicates, that,
of the Canadian Arctic
12/ Rea, 29 .
13/ Rea,, 36-37 .
re sultiI ,
I
1
r
frorr, better medical services . Taking the two years
0 and 1960
	
indices natural increase in the Yukon rose
m 1 .7 in the former year
increase for the
tOousand --~
Archipel for the mo
the Department the i terior and the Department
Mines and Resources, which followed predominantly laissez-faire
policies . When the 1 LLer department was
abolished' in 1.95©,
Northern Affairs came under the aegis of several departments
until 1954, when a new _)epartment of Northern Affairs ,and
5
National Resources was established .- During the Pearson
administration (1963-6 the last-mentioned department was
reorganized into the new Department of Indian Affairs and North-
Development, with greater emphasis being placed on Indian
'-and Eskimo welfare . The economic development of the Northwest
Territories has not as yet afforded much opportunity to the
I
native populationto improve their standard of living owing
to their different - social development .
Professor Rea has suggested that industry might offer
the natives who, the census, comprised
this would seem to suggest a need either-
custodianship
t
Nor n, including the ct
the resent century has been hClu
"The Problem of Economic Development in the
Canadian Arctic, (1964) 71 Queen'sQuarterly 92 .
Rea, 47 .
83 -
for government-operated enterprises or for
	
vernment gu -ide-
lin and subsidies for northern industry .
At presen most of the economic eve .opgent in t e
Subarctic is controlled by large corporations . Developme
L
has
been left primarily in hands of private Lnterp e, c 0
direct governmental- participation in promoting local private
industry being in the exploitation of ura, :.u
federal policy seemed necessitated on `rounds defence and
commercial profit . There has also been scattered defence
installations, military roads and pipelines . The combined efrect
these initiatives by both pu and private sector how,vever,
yielded only an insignificant proport on of total national .
commodity production ; transportation and comparative process
costs have been prohibitive . In recent years the net value
production the North has represented about 0,2 per cent of the
national Total., comparable to the production of Prince Edward
Island . 1dhile this figure represents a doubling of the 1920,
production, the absolute and proportional increase has been, quite
small .- It should be noted, however, that the discovery
huge oil deposits on Alaska's North Slope in 19t8,!7 ~and tie
of the Manhattan through the Northwest Passage have
potentialities of commercial exploitation of t e
North and have stimulated Canadian initiatives, espec -
the
Rea, op .cit .
17/ Vide infra, Too' ff .
deposits, where
)ersaective
the Arctic isla,,ds . Extensive exploration. for oil. i n these
islands has been carried out recently by Pan-Arctic, Limited )
governi'ent-sponsored company with exploration rights o
seventy-million acres in the Arctic .
l8/
Despite encouraging' recent developments, from, the
comparative economic development and popu+ .ation,
the Canadian Arctic, and especially the Arctic Archip O, imust
;lobe .
Perhaps the chief reason for this laggard (1c°.velopment that
up to now government has conceived its role as an a ,ent rather
as a principal . Perhaps ; correctly, it has considered that
its accountability to the electorate, which was almost entirely
concentrated in the southern part of the country, outweighed
rank as one of the most underdeveloped regions of
the desirability of developing the North where formidable trans-
portation and processing costs impeded economic ventures . Until
very recently, it was only in rare cases that the government
could. justify economically expenditures of money in the North .
As, custodian of the .public purse,
	
been reluctant to
apply public monies to a, remote and sparsely populated area ::hen
it was neither, economically;' norr politically expedient to do so .
If one regards the criteria for "effective occupation"
19/
set out Lindley and,Schwarzenberger )_. along with the
relevant case it may readily be appreciated that the
overnment would not have to show the detailed adminis-
trative organization in the Archipelago that would be essential
in morepopulated and more developed areas in order to
demonstrate
Canadian sovereignty over the islands . Longstandin unopposed
administration, long with the acgi.liescence of the native
ionulatio and with the absence of any rival government,
should suffice to show that the area has acquired a pre-
ponderantly Canadian character, and that, there is growing
international acquiescence that Canada does govern the i i '1 .
The vital task of maintaining order throughout the
northern mainland . and the Arctic Archipelago has been entrusted
e Royal Canadian_ Mounted Police . Altho the R .C .M.
have served primarily as a police force,
	
the absence of
other government personnel they have discharged a large number
20/ "Apart from the question of the retaining
sovereignty of the Islands through their occupation b
by R .C .M. Police Detachments, the detachment
personnel during their occupancy have carried out
the duties of Post Masters, Customs Officers
(reporting on the arrival and departure of vessels),
all administrative work for the N .W.T . Administration,
such as, collecting fur export tax, The have rendered
assistance whenever called_ upon by various-Govern-
ment Departments interested in scientific aspects
of the Arctic Islands, such as the collecting and
preserving animals and birds, giving data on geo-
graphical. formationq, reporting on old Eskimo ruins,
and (quite important) taking daily meteorological
.readings on instruments supplied' by the Meteorological
Services Branch of the Department of Transport . In
addition to that they have, made patrols all over
their respective districts and these patrols in most
cases were definitely of an exploratory character
in other words adding to the general. knowledge of
the physical and geographical nature of the islands .
(R.C.M P., "Canadian Sovereignty in _cti.c,"
mimeographed article, undated .)
86
detachments were opene
	
he r:os northcrl
Arctic Archipelago, many of them north s arry Channel .
Personnel at these northerly detachments made reg
covering large distances in the is :nit-; of their respective
posts . Personnel from Pond Inlet in northern Baffin Islan
for exagi e, have patrolled the e,:stern coast as far south
Home Bay and have made patrols Somerset Island and the
Melville Peninsula . The Dundas Harbour Detachment
Scoresby
tar patrols
patrolled
Cornwallis Island and Ellesmere Island . The Cr-is Habour
Detachment has patrolled Ellesmere island extensively, visitin
such points as Scoresby Bay, Makinson Inlet and Baumann Fiord
and crossing the ice northwesterly to Axel Heiberg Island .
T Bache Peninsula Detachment in northeastern Ellesmere Island
has patrolled north along the west coast of the Island
nd thence to Greely Fiord and Axel Heiberg Island .
22/
addition to the above patrol
Inspector visited the extreme Northwesterl islands the
such as Lougheed Island and Ellef Ringnes Island
. 23J
will be recalled, which Denmark
two occasions
The R .C .M.P . Posts, along with d to of establish-
ment, follow : Pond Inlet, Baffin Island, 1921 ;
Craig Harbour, Ellesmere Island, 1922 ; Dundas
Harbour, Devon Island, 1924 ; Kane-Basin, Ellesmere
Island, 1924 ; Bache Peninsula, Ellesmere Island,
1926; Craig Harbour closed 1927 and re-opened
1933 ;` Bache Peninsula closed 1933 ; Dundas Harbour
closed 1933 and re-opened 1945 ; Resolute Bay
Detachment on Cornwallis Island established at
the joint Canadian-U.S . weather station, 1947 .
See R .C .M.P . "Canadian Sovereignty the Arctic
presence
contended were i-es nuilius in the early 1920?s .--~/
	
case
of the joint-established weather stations Resolute of
Cornwallis Island and Eureka Sound, the respective sites
were visited by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Ion- before
the stations were established . Prior to the estabiishrnent of
jointly-operated Canadian-American weather stations, and the
Distant r darning radar system (the D E .W. line) the
- 8/
the l,ounted Police throughout the Arctic and
Archipelago signified that it was Canadian law which' was applied
there, especially in the absence of, pretensions by otherstates
to enforce law and order .,
it should be no e
the
thatt among other duties performed
by the C.N.P ., certain officers have served in a judicial
capacity e Archipelago as Justice's of the Peace. In the
19201s Inspectors Joy and 6lilcox carried out duties pertaining
to that office throughout the Arctic. In one notable case,
Staff-Sergeant then was), investigated the, homicide
a white trader Robert S . Jones by an Eskimo named Noo-.ud-Lap
which occurred on Baffin Island in March, 1920. taff-Sergeant
Joy carried out the police investigation, arrested the accused
found the body and also conducted the autopsy . Afterwards, in
his capacity as Coroner he held the inquest, and as Justice of
the Peace held the Preliminary Hearing on the charge of murder
a.nd comnu teed the accused for trial .
With the establishment of the Territorial Court of
the Northwest Territories on July,.1 1.955, Mr . Justice Sissons,
and since 1960 his successor Mr . Justice have - flown to
Vide supra, 56-58 . .
2 / R .C .M.P ., . "Canadian Sovereignty Ia t
all arts of the Arct
	
constitut? courts :vhich ~p plied
Can an law wherever they went
com.>>assion,ate understaanding of Eskimo culture, d his o-itteriht,
wherever ossibl adapt Ins Cunadi-n
-o a
r d±cally
c t:le-re .nt sods sLen: earned hip r acih pr se, but a timed
r antag,onisin the hii'her bureaucracy in Ottawa .
The more formalized justice ~Jlixt the Terr
broughtto the North reinforced the effective oo2pancy of Arctic
lands and served to demonstrate, on occasion ., Canadian sover-
eignty over Arctic waters . With respect to the latter thorny
cuestion, the recent case of R . v. Tootali
, affords some
assistance in ascertaining the extent of Canadian-jurisdiction'
in the North . Althoug the case is subject to reversal on appea
as it stands it would strongly support a C nauiari claim, to
sovereignty over Arctic waters .
Tootolik, an, Eskimo, was charged with violating the
Northwest Territories Game Ordinance 23/ by killing
bear and two cubs in April, 1969 on the sea ice more than seven
26/ See Sissons,,Judge-of the Far North, Toronto,
1968, for the details of Mrs . Justice Sisson's
judicial duties in the Arctic
.
23/ O .N.W.T., 1960 (2d) Ch .2 . The information stated
:
"The informant says that he has reasonable
probable grounds to believe and does believe that
1'ootali1, E4-321, of Spence Bay, Northwest Territories,
on or about the 14th day of April ., 1969, at or near
Pal:sey, 13ay, Northwest Territories, did unl .-,i ;,fully
hunt a female polar bear with young-, contrary to item.
6 (b) of Schedule B-of the Game Ordinance .
2g
miles fro :: the west coast
	
the Boothia Peninsula.,---'
Mark de eerdt, C ., counsel for the accused E -,o,
argued inter olia that the Court 'Lacked jurisdiction becaa,i
e leged offence took place outride Canadinn territory or
territorial waters .
In rejecting the argument defence counsel,
Justice Narrow cited statements by rime inister St . Laurent
and P ime Min.iste'r Pearson affirming Canadian sovereignty
the Arctic seas north of the mainland . 30 While conced'.
the importance of such statement
he suggested, on the basis
of a. study authorities and precede,t , that the actual
day to day display of sovereign ights thearea was of
greater significance that official assertions of jurisdiction ;
he then proceeded examine executive and judicial acts
manifestingauthority over the sea ice off the mainland :
One can go back least 40 years to find
Canada's R .C .M.P . patrolling the arctic areas
including patrols over the sea ice and zttendi_ng.
to law and order and t the welfare inhabitants
(mostly Eskimo) .
nce 1.955 when the, Territorial Court of the
Northwest Territories was set up under the ;orth
west `Ge;rri,:cories Act (R .S.C. 1952, . c .331)' iv has
been notorious that this court has administered
the laws of Canada a I parts of: the Territory,
2 / The location of the polar bears is not shown
the judgment, but was confirmed by 1r . Justice
Morrow in a letter dated 10 December, 1 .969, to
Professor D.A. Sehmeiser . For factual. details
of the hunt and subsequent trial see Time
(Canadian Edition November 28, 1.969, 13-14 .
30/ (1970) 9 C .R.N.S . 7 .
includinsg such of the Arctic islands as have in-
habitants and this by oing .on circuit several
times a year and by holding court in the various
places visited . It is to be observed that at
I-eas't on one occasion' court was actually held; in
ski-equipped otter-sitting i_n the sea-.ice off
Tuktoyaktuk. Again in early 1 .956 the late Justice
Sissons presided over' a case involving an lis .cir :no
named .Allan Kaotok who was charged with committing
murder on the sea ice some 60 miles North-East of
Parry River in Queen Maud Gulf . The Court did not
hesitate to assume to itself jurisdiction ,to hear'
the case . It is interesting to note that the
present alleged' offence took place only some
200 miles_ from the .situs of the Kaotok offence
and 2U0:<miles is of no'real consequence in this
large territory . 31/
fore the Tootal:ik case accordingly there were precedents
the assumption of jurisdiction by both the courts and the
police over offences coi,titted on the' frozen seas north of Canada
in -areas which, on a narrow construction night be regarded as
i_nterna.tional waters .
The Tootllik case may be used as an authority' by prop--
onents of a proclamation of Canadian sovereignty over the entire
Arctic Archipelago, embracing waters, islands and permanent ice .'
It might be mentioned, that the parliamentary committee headed by
Ian Watson, M.P ., which presented
December 16, 1_969,
taken.
32/
90'
unanimously recommended that such action be
this connection, legislative action by the government
create an extensive Arctic anti-pollution zone-and to e
territorial waters totwelve miles in breadth, 3 Jwould
3
	
Ibid., 97-9
32/ Vide infra, -112 f
33/ Vide infra,
tend
most,
claim to Arctic sovereignty . If
116-125 .
probably reinforce ~~n eventual
one avoids metaphysical subtleties, soverei
	
om a stic
«sp et, be re rded merely a sum total jurisdictional
;comers exercised in a given area the exclusion of other
authorit es . With the accretion
j urisdictions i northern
ers a i throughout the Arctic Archipelago, a situation ari e
where the d sti_nc ion between thetotality of - jurisclict o :ns
C ;';L'rcisc Canada and the concept of soverei . ;7i-it
i remains
true, nevertheless - that in. extreme ccs such as
exercise of jurisdiction over pirates- on'th high s
distinction may be made between jurisdiction as a 1'
and sovereignty ac a political one.
On the unofficial level, dedicated oblate missionaries
of the adian province have for many; decadessought to brim ;
Christianity to the northern Eskimo, along with lesser numbers
of other orders . Among the : Anglicans, Archibald Lang Fleming
was consecrated first Bishop of the Arctic_ in
December 21, 1 .933, 34/ it interesting that
Fleming's missionary-activities was Baffin Island
dinnipeg
a map of Bishop,
on
the focus OL B- i-shop
although his
_I ,
huge diocese, involving an area of two and three-quarter millio
square miles, embraced the entire Arctic Archipelago and North-
West Territories as well as Northern Quebec, 3s/ In the case of
both Roimmaln atbolics and ,,,licans, who have displayed the
greatest energy amongst the various- churches in evangelizing the
North, the dioceses concerned have formed part of the Canadian
church establishments, with the respective bishops being: ultimatel
cinswereable to the Roman Catholic and Anglican primates of Canada .
34/ Fleming, Archibaldthe`Arctic, Toronto,
1965, 239 .
35/ See ibid ., 1Q-11, for
Flemingts diocese .
responded . After 1945,
the resim of militar defence, although northern
Canada has never been nhvsicali invaded,- there' have at times
b en threats of invasion. to which the government in Ottawa -
or exampl
	
there was an. apprehension
Soviet Invasion over the Pole ; even during the Second hr
ght be adci (,~ the threat a Japanese invasion of
36
the Con dia.n worth via aska was discounted --
The Distant Early WWWarnii d .W .) line, which wo ;s
CO : -.1p eted 1957, was des :[ened to maximize the interval of
time between first altert ; and attack :dur-ing which interceptors
would take to the air, retaliatory action wouldd be started and
civilian populations could take cover . A recent criticism of
the D .E .W . line concept has been that the strategy it envisages
archaic inasmuch as it was fashioned thwart an attack by
manned bombers rather than the present incomparably swifter
intercontinental ballistic missiles .
D.E .W. line radar stations, which wereset up along
the 70th parallel north latitude from Point Barrow, Alaska,
to eastern Baffin' Island, were organized under the joint aut;pices
the it.C A.F . and the U.S . Air Force . The line, which comprises
six sectors, three thousand miles in length and is Jointly
manned' by Canadian and American personnel . Although some anxiety
3expressed in Canada-77 that a substantial American military
presence in the Arctic might pose a threat - to Canadian sovereignty,
tie rule of legal
liability, to bich the American, government
has agreed by treaty,
provide that where visiting servicemen
breach contracts entered into in_ their
unofficial capacity,
or
commit torts against Canadian civilians, it is
Canadian
law that will be applied to
resolve disputes . One
. commentator
describes the relevant agreement as
follows :
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement entered' into
force for Canada on September 27, 1953
. This
agreement follows' in its main 'features the provisions
regarding immunity from civil jurisdiction of
l.oc~,1
courts
in the unratified Agreement Concerning the
Status of Members
of the Armed Forces of the Brussels
Treaty Powers, of December 21, '1949 . It
is the
views of the United States,' the principal
sending
state, which has always' insisted on being, grantee
complete immunity from local jurisdiction for its
forces abroad, and, on the other, the views of
the United Kingdom and other
receiving European
nations, which have favoured subjectiop g9f the
visiting forces to local
jurisdiction .
%
In the field of criminal
law, the Canadian Supreme Court, i
conformity with an emphasis observable throughout :the entire
hhtitish Commonwealth,' has severely restricted
the immunity from
39/
Canadian. criminal, law of visiting forces .-
38/ Meron, !'Civil Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts
over United States Military Personnel in
Canada,
(m957) 12 U .T .L.J . 71-72 .
39/ i the Matter of a Reference
s_ to . Whether Members
of the -Military or Naval Forces of the United
States
of America are Exempt from Criminal Proceedings
CanadianCriminals Courts, 1:943) S .C .R . 433 .
See also Evatt, "The Visiting Forces Act, 1952,'
(1953,-55), 1 Sydney Law Review, 225 .
CE
iThile individual servicemen are su ject
	
broad spectrum
local jurisdiction, if they act in official capacity
as agents the sendin,, state, the international law rules
forbidding the impleading of foreign sovereign powers mayy
apply . In ti-his last case, the disputes must be resolved, if
they are to be resolved at all, the diplomatic rather than
t e 1 forum . The above le provisions,, however.,
disclose 1 a great many situations American servicemen
of the local forum .
40/
the wake of Prime Minister Trudeauts policy
April 3 1969, which emphasized that a Canadian
military presence in the North would h consolidate
sovereignty,-military planners foresee increased deployment
of servicemen ;: throughout the Arctic . About half of the 397''
e far north 1969 were concentrated
150 miles north of Edmonton near the mouth of
the Macken ie River . Detachments of the Armed Forces were located
the four major D F E . line stations on Canadian Territory,
and at !A,lert, on the northern tip of Ell .esr,ere Island, 900 miles
north of the Arctic cle 41/
It .; should be mentioned that the duty of protectin
nationals and visiting aliens which is incumbent upon a Sove e
is discharged in part by the rescue flights provided by the l: C .
for those lost in the Arctic . There have been many such rescue
operations he past . In 63, there were four searches, and
Department of National Defence, Information
Services, elease AFN 167-69, dated November
1959 .
Ibid loc .cit. - The four D.E .W. line stations
are situated at Cape Dyer,' Hall Beach Cambridge
I
and Cape Parry, .N.W.T.
43/ Vide - supra, fn.-40 at
44/ Ibid . loc, cit .
45/_ Saskatoon Star Phoenix, March 4,'1970, 13 .
policy
north of the
Re
of the
Over a number' of
The Department
headquarters
l
in 1969 there were f:Lve mayor aerial searches
60th parallel
The R .u
	
using its patrol aircraft,
L o have conducted roe number of sovereigntf" ghts
over northern ice . canting 1,000 feet over the Archipelago
between Thule, Greenland, and Yellowknife in the Northwest
Territories, the route of the aircraft is directly over the
Arctic islands. In 1.969, Argus ; patrol aircraft f :ex,r 39
regu.larl.y-scheduled surveillance missions,, for a total of
421 hours, and spent almost as much time again' investigating
z i3
reporting sightings of various kinds . Two Tracker aircraft
flee on an ice-reconnaissaance mission from' Cape Dyer,
Bay_and Inuvik during the September, 1969 voyane
Manhattan through the Northwest Passage . Other activities
performed by the military in the North include communications
research, mapping and engineering projects .
solute
and especially between the wars, military surveyors and
aerial photographers made maps of the entire Western Arctic .-44
In conformity with Mr . 'Trudeau's
of National Defence plans to establish a northern
base .~FS/ In announcing this objective, Defence, Minister Cadieu :
said that "three or four exercises" would be held' in the . Arctic
in 1970 before' the size-and composition of an Arctic force was
decided upon. A planned reduction of manpower of more than 20,000
men will reduce Canada's military establishment to'80,000 by 1973 .
the same time, there wi
	
sser emphasis Canada's
more use of the armed forces
96
or various
purposes within national boundaries, including their deployment
at strategic, locations Northern Canada' and t Arctic Archi-
pela„o .
the contest military defence, it 1
that the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone
intcresti
CADIZ
seas an rcraft was required identify itself and
itself to appropriate traffic controls from the surface
be contended that the setting up f ADIZ constituted
orsement
Pollution
f $500,000 for
Research (ALUk
i
In addition to the development f the Arctic anti-
zone, the federal government has announced an alloc tion
the 1970-71 sca -A year for the Arctic Land Use
)rog;ramme . The programme seeks to' eliminate
h
and
the similar American zone, known simply as the Air Defence
Identification Zone (AD!'-' , would be analogous at least in
physical dimensions, the Arctic anti-pollution zone .= These
zones were established just after the outbreak of the Korean -War
1950, hen Last--':lest relations had deteriorated badly and there
was growing fear North American defence circles of hostile
aeri attacks . The respective zones were of varying breadths,
but certain of them extended seawards for substantially more than
one hundred mi es . When a roachi
a nd western coasts f the continen although still over
these zones on the eastern
to subject
It might
U . S .. enc
for
a .
Nurchison, ContiguousAir Space ZoneIn
International Law, Ottawa, 1955 . chapter 1 On tie
Arctic anti-pollution zone, vide infra,
Tt gnificant that the Canndian government
is justifying the Arctic anti.-pollution zone on
grounds of national security, which would apply
also to the creation of ADIZ and CADIZ, vide infra .
effect and
pollution . Lader the new regulations,
permanent damage
	
the Arctic environment,, both on the northern
mainland and in the Archipelago. Land-use regulations will be
drawn up and applied in a number of :, :ones the boundaries of w-hic
will reflect varying degrees of sensitivity to pollution . It has
been one of the marked, weaknesses in Arctic development hereto-
Eore that the , e have been virtually no regulations a ain
condition of using
land developers will be required to obtain land-use permits
from the federal government and to pay land e - fees at a standard
alrate-per acre . They will
reports to the federal government
so be required to submit periodic
their ;acti.vities . ' These
regulations, course, will apply to both Canadian and alien
corporations, an! submission to them by thelatter would be
least implied recognition of Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic .
The enforcement of game' regulations is et another %
in which the federal government exercises control overr the Arctic .
Until 1966 when it was abolished', the Arctic Islands Game Preser
including all of the islands of the Archipelago, was a sanctuary
for wildlife .
49/
The Reserve was abolished, presumably to all
hunting for sport as an incentive to the local tourist industry .
Nevertheless game regulations applying to the islands are _n
e applied under the jurisdictionl of the Territorial
Game Branch Department of Industry and Development,
~+ Saskatoon Star Phoenix, a 1970, 18 .
Novakowski (Canadian Wildlife Service),
writer, February 4
Ibi	cit .
1970 .
e,
9 8
now assisting in
Arctic in order to
The aim of the regulations
but to prevent the degrad-
3/
Until now, there has been no outside utilization
of the one resources of the Arctic Archipelago, and only
very limited resource use by the, local inhabitants . There
's more use, at present, of marine resources than of wildlife
resources or, land . When engaged in their limited exploitation
of n
	
, the inhabitants are subject to the Northwest Territories
r
GameOrdinance and to e eral Department of Fisheries and
orestry regulations respecting marine animal
the first time since 1917, muskoxen have been open to hunting
by, Eskimo , in 1970, twelve were allocated for hunting purposes .
in the southern ',-)art of Ellesmere 31-and,and the northern part
of the adjacent Devon Island .
52/
The Canadian Wildlife Service of the Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development is
drawing up land-use regulations for the
maintain a safe ecological balance .
is not only to forestall pollution,
ation of the environment in genera
Reverting to the criteria for effective occupation
down by bi dley and Schwarzenberger and in t'ne .relevant
5lt/
law,-- it . is suggested that in view of the
laid
51/ O.N W.T., 1960 (2d), ch .2 .
52/ Novakowski to writer, supra,
loc.cit.
Vide supra, 77-79, and for a discussion
oi_ the relevant case ~ , vide supra., 43-5
a.dministre t
activities of the Canadian government in the Arctic, in the
realms governmental administration, police protection and
the protection of aliens, lefence and rescue services, missionary
work by Canadian clergy among the Eskimos and Indians,' extenOve
game re ulations and anti-pollution policies, and in other ways,
the overrment has manifested sovero
	
authority over
the
whole
Arctic Archipelago . This conclusion is especi_d ll evident in
view of the sparse population and low level' of present economic
development the region, which reduces the need for detailed
the larger bureaucracy which would be needed,
elsewhere„ I is also reinforced by the consideration that no
other State within recent decades ha questioned Canadian sover-
eignty over the islands of the Archipelago .
sovereignty over
and specialists
external relatic
the publ the let
ibly dre
the Pass
an appropriate o
an
absence
one writ
titular
T,ter , and thei do
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RCTIC WATERS
,LOPc-EN ' OF INTERNATIUW
the issue of
The two voyac e humb .Le o,e zany ° s
Manhattan through c he Canadian Arctic water ±
dramatized, unprecedented why,
Lions or agreements to cover
The public media, Parliament,
e is a ecology, - navigation
law vividly brought before
atio: s and the poss-
environmentel consequences of the opening up of
as a maritime thoroughf - r .
a regime for Arctic waters
heightened ecu-
said : . . .international law has not as
1note of the circumstances tech
not appear to be any spec ~1: international
them."~~ Prior t
	
e discov
of what may be the rich r_ oss
in Nori ri another writer understandE
whether eninterrr s r a e passage between the Labrador
ileautort Seas would ever become rea 1 i Until recent
Smith, overei,,nty in the r nadian
e.ct of an international Problem, in Macdonald
ed T rctic'Frontier, Toront as,
Claims
n the of c Regions
Lad Chiaf1v as Intern
lororti 1965, 251°.
IMAM 1970
Canadian
N for
stel (ad
id
App lie
r
doubted,
Alexander, "Offshore Claims of the Vforld,"
in Alexander (ed .) The Law ofthe Sea, 1967,
Ohio State University Press, 77 .
Vide supra, chapter two, for a ; discussion of
the claims to archipelagic waters, based on
straight baseline systems, ; . made by ;Indonesia
and the Philippines . In addition, there exists
a growing tendency in Centrall and South America
for states to claim up to 200-miles breadth of
territorial sea, especially to protect their
fishing industries . On March 25, 1970, President
Medici of Brazil signed a decree claiming a . strip
of territorial waters 200-miles wide adjacent to
the Brazilian littoral .' Chile, Ecuador, Peru and
a number of Central American countries have made
identical claims. Almost 100 vessels of the
California-based tuna' fleet have been seized and
fined by Ecuador''and Peru for violating the 200-
mile-limit, which the United States' does not recog-
nize, in the past fifteen years. As ,a compromise,
the United States is attempting to have Latin-
American nations agree to a 12-mile limit . The
Christian Science Monitor, . Thursday, April 9, 1970.4
I
was an air of unreality about the whole question o a regular
maritime route through polar waters .
Although the Geneva Conferences on the law of the sea
codified much of the applicable maritime a4 , they said little
or nothin about a . peculiar legal regime for archipelagoes .
There would not in fact, appear to be any widespread recognition
that archipelagoes constitute an exception to the'del .imitation
f offshore waters along the more regular type of coastline .
In recent decades, however there have been frequent innovations
in the law of the sea, and a growing awareness of the need for
new rules,, and hasty or categorical judgments should be avoided .,
the hi .
custom .
seas,
The assertion by many states of
102
;ual.ified rights over
instance to retulate customs, fishing or
the assertion since 1945 of a ri,.h to exploit
7
a unilateral act into a recognized international
Accordingly, the mere fact that a claim is of an
)recedented nature, and has no pre-existing sanction, does not
deprive it, in suitable cases, of contributing to the progressive
continental she,l f ,
pollutio , and
the resources
	
e subsoil and sea bed of the continental
shelf, along with the jud~'ment of the International Court
Justice in 1951 in the Anglo-N-Ir i Fisheries Case- represent
innovations in the traditional law of the sea . As . 'with President
Truman's claim to rights in the Continental Shelf in 1945 the
historical, pattern has often been that a. novel right c i ~eimed
unilaterally by some state has developed into a precedent and
subsequent claims by other states have gradually transformed what
development of international_ law .
In the case of the
for its appropriation by the littoral : state wra.s underlain by the
fn. 3 supra .
the justification
International Court of Justice, Fisheries Case,
(United -Kingdomv .' Norway) Judgment of - I8 December
1951, Reports' of Judgments,, Advisory Opinions and
Orders .
Theinitial claim to a qualified right over the
a.djacent conti n .ental. shelf was made on September
1945, by President Truman, when he declared' in
executive, proclamation that "the exercise of
jurisdiction over the natural resources of the
subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf by
the contiguous nation is reasonable and just,"
The exercise of such jurisdiction was not to
affect the legal. status of,the superjacent waters,
and when neighbouring states shared a continental
.shelf their mutual boundary was to be determined
jointly "in accordance with equitable principles ."
See Fenwick, ;InternationalLaw, 4th ed ., New York,
1965, 447-448 .
fact that resource shortages
	
(2 iaprovements in technology
have made the hitherto inaccessible subsoil valuable. III
these circumstances, seems reasonable that the contiguous
state should exploit such subsoil . Similarly, it could be
argued that Canada might claim the subsoil under the permanent
ice within its sector boundaries hick may lie beyond its
shelf), since this now becoming exploitable and economically
valuable :with the development of "commercial" submarines .
Until the initial voyage of the Manhattan there were
no compelli pressures upon the Canadian government to enunciate
any position on the legal status of Arctic waters . Except for
,in occas :ionaal e ploratory expedition, polar waters appeared remote
and impassible t e world's shipping interests .
11 THE VOYAGES OF THE
Renewed interest inthe feasibility of using the
Northwest Passage as a commercial sea_ route was prompted by the
discovery, early_ in 1968, of what may be the richest oilfields
yet discovered in North America . Conservative estimates of the
oil yield of the Prudhoe Bay areaa on Alaska's North Slope range
the Middle
oil needs .
from five to ten billion barrels, as against a
five billion barrels for the richest oilfields
on the Continent, in 1930, in East
Texas.-
This discovery of oil is of political as well as
yield of some
formerly discovered
economic
importance because of the unsettled international situation in
East,
:,,which
supplies about 28 per cent of the world's
With the global supply of oil barely adequate_ for
existing requiremen geologists ranged widely over promising
7/ Newsweek, September 22, 1969, 80 .'
formations to find alternative oil deposits . It is essential for
most Western states
	
have oil supplies which could be relied
upon regardless the world-wide repercussions of the Arab-
Israeli confrontation.
Exploitation of the oil discoveries is not o
vast commercial. and military significance ; it would result in
more prosperous existence for Alaska's depressed native in-
habitants . Eskimos, Indians and Aleuts, who constitute about
twenty per cent of the State's population live, for the most
part, in poverty, and the former reliance' of the State on federal
revenues to meet most current expenditures left little prospect
for substantial betterment of their condition . Factionalism among;
Alaskan natives has until now preventedd them from speaking with
a united voice. Some two years ago,_ however, -a coalitition of
Alaskan native societies presented the American government with
a claim to almost the whole publicly-owned territory of Alaska,- /
the ground of ownership by historic right . '` It istmost probab
that the claim envisages an eventual cash settlement which can
better native conditions in the State'./ Such a
the federal government which' has the
a
be used to
settlement would come from
power of disposition over the lands involved . In, response to the
claim and pending, settlement the federal government placed the
public lands involved t der a mora.toriu : Whatever-the legal.
merits of the native societies' case' may be, they have a good moral
argument as the original inhabitants of the State . Whatever the
Alaska will be able to help the
Cf . "Of Alaskals 365 million acres, 272_ million
acres are in the public domain, : ;and of these the
natives claim 250 million acres . " Lear,' "Nortli,,est
Passage to What?" in SaturdayRevie November 1,19 9,
9/ Rogers, "Party Politics of Protest Politics : Current
Political Trends in Alaska," in the Polar Record,
14 (1969) .
wi
	
brim; from $500 million to $2 billion to the . state treasury
in bonus money .
The two Arctic voyages of the S .S . Manhattan
technological and transportation problems posed by the discovery
oil
. Richas the resources are, they must be conveyed to their
industrial and military users in the United States and elsewhere,
the rigours of the Alaskan climate as well as a Northwest
Passage which is blocked by ice for much
of the year present
challenging problems .
The three modes of bringing the Alaskan oil to world
markets that have so far been proposed are : (1) the building; of
800-mile long pipeline from Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic Ocean
iD the year-round port V Idez on the Gulf of Alaska, with
a fleet of tankers carrying the oil from Va.lde o: the
Coast ; ] .I/ (2) the
of at least 250,000 cie dwei ht tons, of. which
a smaller uurototype, 12 which tankers would conco vey
eastern seaboard through the lorthwest Passag
construction of an extensive pipeline system from
through the Yukon to Central. Canada, 'with "feeder" lines serving
American markets on the Pacific Coast,' in the Midwest and'ultim„tel
1in all states
10/ Cahn, Alaskan 1 Dollars Could Relieve Wide-
spread Poverty, Monitor, September 10,
1969, 11 .
Monitor, September
"Oil Haxards of the Frozen North," in the Geo-
graphical Maagazine, August, 1969, 359 ._
reflect the
Nest
building by 1975 of six giant icebreaker tankers
the Manhattan is
the oil to the
and (3) the
1969
$ '
estimates have placed the cost
the cost or conveyance towards
of oil production in the area,
on the richness of the actual. oil deposits .
The delay in the construction of the proposed
Alaskan pipeline, coupled with mounting inflation,is steadily
driviru , :nwa-rd its estimated building cost. Originally,, ,t
thought that the line could be built for $900 million, but
at $1 .3 to 1 .5 billion, edging
the lowest estimates of the value
about $5 billion.
14
that the high cost of conveyance of the oil by pipeline could
engender
greater consideration of conveying the oil by tanker
through the Northwest Passage . The economic feasibility of
justi v some of the more optimistic forecasts,
could be of great economic' importance to Canada .
The Manhattan is the first commercial. vessel
lthrough the Northwest Pass~ige .-=5, At 11.5,000 tons,
of the largest ships everr builtand the most powerful
the U .
	
merchant fleet .
,7a s
later
will depend, of course,
Should the deposits
such a pipeline
to navigate
one
vessel in
14/ - Monitor,, May 14, 1970, 13 .
15/ Other transits' of the Northwest Passage are credited
to Robert McCure (1854-1.855) ; Arnunsents . Gjoa,,
(1903-1906), the R .C .M.P .. vessel St . Roch, (1940-
42, and 1.944) ; H' M,C . S . Labrador, (1954) U . S .C G .-
Storis, Bramble and Spar,, (1957) ; U .S . Seadragon
(nuclear.-powered submarine) (1960 and 1962 .) ; and
the John A . Macdonald-in,1966 . Transits in the
vicinity of the North Pole, . under Arctic ice, were
made by U.S . Nautilus (Augus:t, 1958) U.S . Skate,
(August, 1958 and March, 1959)' U . S . Sargo (February,
1960) ; U .S . - Seadragon'and,U.S . Skate (August, 1962) ;
and the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine Leninsky
Kornsomol made a transit in the vicinity of the
Pole in January, 1963 . (The writer is grateful
Professor R. M. Bone for the above information) .
i 0l 7
the U
	
merchant fleet .- It may
through the Northwest Passage
Canada
for
16/ SaturdayReview, Novembe
17/ Time, September 5, 1969, 67 .
compared with the 55,000
tons nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, built
one year before her 1961, . or with the 57,000 tons of
huge Second World battle-ship Missouri . The vessel
roughly a half-scale p ototype of a l^rger fleet the humble
011 Con many . hopes to develop if t concludes that transit
feasible for corpmercial
purposes . Irl seinding the ship through the Arcticthe
American firm was relying on Canadian experience which-had-
found, by a process of trial and error, that ore carriers
could negotiate the ice-locked St . Lawrence in winter' with
only occasional help from icebreakers .
16/
If the Yanhattan
could make the Passage without undue difficulty,' her owners
considered that larger vessels would find the route even
easier .
Significant as the opening up the northern sea
route wou d be for development of the Arctic, and' the transfer
heir distant markets of its potentially wealthy mineral
resources, a further consequence of the opening up of an
ocean thoroughfare would be the reduction of the distance
between Tokyo and New York by 3,320 miles, saving shippers
both time and money . 7 ' If commercial shipping becomes feasiblee
in the Arctic Transport Minister Jamieson has predicted that
would be confronted with an estimated cost . of $l billion
navigational aids and increased icebreaking services .
the Minister foresaw no Canadian objections to the development
1Arctic sea rou emphasized that users of the route
woi:id have to assume a share of the expenditures involved in
keeping it open. He added later that Canada would have 'o
real national interest" developing permanent icebreaking
capabilities to service such a route .
1.8/
In its initial journey in 1969 the :,ianhattan was unable
to cross the entire Archipelago in international waters. In being
diverted
	
its alternative route through Prince of Wales Strait,
the vicinity of the Princess P. yal Islands it was brought with-
in Canadian territorial waters (and hence within Canadian juris-
diction), even ;by the rigid standards of the U .S . State Department.) /
During its second voyage in 1970, Captain A.W.-Smith of
the Manhattan considered that the problei of successful Arctic
navigation was not necessarily one overcome by building
lar.ger_vessels, but one to be dealt with by adequate, support,
services . His attitude emphasized the need for international
cooperation n the, . Passage, and the value of Canadian auxiliary
vessels' and related assistance . An associate from the Humble
Oil Company accompanying, Captain Smith, Stanley Haas, still
foresaw the construction of a fleet of some 250,000' to 350,000
deadweight tons, with construction underway by 1973 . Company
officials on the vessel during its 1970 voyage emphasized the .
benefits of mutual cooperation .- The-Manhattan*s owners offered
to provide scientific data on the journey to the Canadian
lo/ Saskatoon Star-Phoenix,, September 27, 1969,
and November 10, 1969, 18 .
1 / Time, October 1 .0, 1969, 17, the Saskatoon
Star-Phoenix, September ,4, 1970 5, and cf
The Tolten, (1946) P . 135 .
governmen
	
expressed gratitude for icebreaking, meteor-
ological ther assistance provided by, the government .
Although the Manhattan was unsuccessful
traversing
the Northwest' ;Passage in 1969 and 1970, it did no return
from its initial voyage unscathed . While proceeding throu
the turbulent . Arctic seas and thick ice, an iceberg broke
open a hole in the hull of the tanker big enough for a truck
drive into .
20/,
precision engineering which enabled the
vessel to make the round trip to Prudhoe Bay Alaska and back
11l THE PROBLEM OF ARCTIC POLLUTION
New York . in 79 days (as compared with the three years
required by, Roald Amundsen in 1903-1906.) also. enabled it to
remain afloat despite its eevere injury. While the voyage
itself was unsuccessful a major inadequacy in the vessel became
apparent before it docked its home port . It was found that
the tankers 43,000 horsepower engines generated insufficient
power to move' her through heavy ice, which at times reached
a -thickness of forty feet
. On several occasions it froze
'fast, and theaccompanying Canadian icebreakers had to come
to its assistance . The difficulties the, Manhattan encountered
suggested, that future tankers should have heavier armament and
greater power. While these technical requirements. may be met
by engineering ingenuity, the ability of supertankers to negotiate
.northern waters without mishap raises more substantial problems .
110 -
When the Manhattan returned home with, a gaping ; hole
its hull, the consequences of a disastrous apillage
	
oil
in arctic waters were dramatically re-emphasized . There was
a growing awareness of the Arctic pollution problem in Canada,
and much' pressure was . exerted upon the government to do some-
thing about the problem . It was particularly discomfiting, that
the injury was sustained despite the special construction of
the vessel to withstand rigorous Arctic conditions. Alsoo
ominous was t e fact that the Manhattan was the prototype, of
an entire fleet of larger tankers which might display the same
defect.
The pollution problem is intensified in the Arctic
by the substantially slower rate of chemical change in polar
waters . Oil which might be dissipated rapidly by evaporation
in other climates_ could pollute Arctic waters almost indefinitely .
The problem is especially distressing because existing technology
to combat oil pollution is as one oil company executive ; describes
it
"primitive,"
L1 / One of the most effectice anti-pollution
techniques yet : devised n fact, is merely spreading straw over
the affected area and picking it up with pitchforks as was
done at Santa Barbara,' California . With 180 tanker
carrying capacity of 100,000 tons now in existence,
having a:
and a further
310 being planned, the proportions of the danger are evident .
In recent' years some international regulation of the
pollution menace has been achieved . There is, however, no
centralized' international authority with effective sanctions
21/ L .P . Haxby, manager for air and water conservation
of the Shell Development Company, Monitor, January 9,
1970, 5 .
for enforcement purposes, and what regulations there
piecemeal and sometimes of little effectiveness .
The London Convention of 1954 which_ resulted' in the
international Convention for the Prevention of
Pollutionof
the Sea
	
Gail set up "prohibited zones" in territorial waters
and harbours of contracting parties . The Convention calls for
municipal legislation forbidding the discharge of "persistent"
oils (such as crude oil fuel oil) by ships registered in the
countries of signatory states .
22/
While a significant advance,
these legislative initiatives have depended upon the voluntary
cooperation of states and apply only to certain designated areas
of the sea' adjacent to national coastlines, and to ships flying
the flags of member states . It is manifest' that in the -a
the supertanker something of a more inclusive character, in
terms of both the geographical area it covers' and the ships
provisions, is required .
Canada the provinces have enacted most of the anti-
pollution legislation,23~although the federal government has
made regulations under the
Canada' Shipping Act relating to
pollution in Canadian inland and territorial water.s .2
4/
In
See - Colombos, op.cit . 374.
See the summary of such legislation in Cooke,
Pilon and Thompson, Water Pollution Control:,
A Digest of Legislation and Regulations in
ForceinCanada, 3rd ed ., Montreal, 1957
Part V11A of the Act enacts the provisions
the Fourteenth Schedule of the International
Convention for thePreventionofthe Pollution
the Sea by Oil, 1954, videsupra.
Pursuant
	
such regulations, t is prohibited to discharge oil
from
ships of any nationality which fouls the surface of the
water ; a mixture of 100 parts of oil to one` million. parts of
the mixture is deemed to so foul the surface
. There
addition, regulations prohibiting Canadian ships
from d .schsr ;_
oil or oily mixtures outside Canadian waters in designated
"prohibited' zones
Pursuant to the Convention mentioned o
such zones have been established in the Adriatic, North Sea,
adjacent to Australia and 100 miles, outwards from the Atiantic
effective
world's oceans . In
step in
direction, it depends_ on universality, <;oodwill. and reciproc
for its efficacy, and as it stands at present it is piecemeal .
An international body will almost certainly have be set up
which can authoritatively police the use of the high seas to
prevent pollution . A body of a supra-national character with
sanctions could do much to ensure the purity of the
a world where anti-pollution measures are
still established under unilateral auspices however, and where
there are auguries of an increasingly large fleet of supertankers
in the Arctic and elsewhere, the Canadian government was confronted
with the question of what it could do now to prevent pollution a
Arctic .
IV THE LEGISLATION
Among the most important and influential statements
issued the problems of Arctic sovereignty and pollution before
the government brougl-t out its official polic April 1970,
which was issued in ecembe
	
i9
2
an ' at son,
official
request from, e Manhattan for permission to navigs e throu
strong
and Northern Developmen
In introducing; the Report in Pariiar;;en
the Northwest Passage, committee members considered
andin.g Committee on Indian fairs
'to meet what seemed to be a deliberate
the United' States government to skate around the
soverei r,nty issue . A subcommittee of 10 members of the Standing
Committee went north on ptember 3, 1969, fully aware f the
I
significance of the gesture they were about to make ."- The
"gesture" was an
unequivocally-worded
message of welcome from
the all arty delegation of parliamentarians to the crew of
the Manhattan .
Captain Roger Stewart
S .S . Manhattan .
Your daring voyage through the Canadian
Arctic Archipelago will stir the imagination
of people everywhere who are interested in
Arctic Development .
Bienvenue dans
Welcome to Canadian
2
We wish you God Sppe bon voyage .
26./ Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, First Repo t
(Arctic Sovereignty), The Standing Committee on,
Indian Affairs and Northern Developme 1969 .
27/ House ofCommons Debates, January 22, 1970 2718 ff .
28/ Ibid ., 2718-19 .
29/ Vide supra, fn. 26 at 1. The Message was sent
the Manhattan by radio on September 5 1969, as the
vessel entered Lancaster Sound at the eastern fringe
of the Archipelago.
1Although there was a certain opera bouffe quality about the
message (it was not passed between heads of state or between
governments but sent by . a Canadian parliamentary delegation
acting on its own initiative to a private American-owned vessel)
it expressed the deep concern shared by Canadians about .nationa
control over .the Arctic . As a dramaticgesture unanimously
supported by members of all parties on the committee, the i,essage
helped to crystallize Canadian public opinion behind strong
governmental action'declaratory .of Cancndiin rights in the Arctic .
In its Report, the Committee welcomed the voyage of
the Manhattan, but emphasized the dangerss of oil pollution
inherent in future trips by large tankers through the Arctic .
The anticipated rapid developement of tanker traffic throe
Archipelago would' inevitably outpace the much slower . process
arriving
	
an international agreement on adequate pollution
controls . The .ecology of the Arctic, which is especially vu rerable
oil pollution, could not be left open to such risks during
protracted diplomatic . negotiations preceding an agreement .
The Committee alsostressed that a large distinction
should be drawn between the Arctic Archipelago, and the Pacific
and other archipelagoes in temperate waters where international
maritime trade routes had existed for centuries . The waters of
the former Archipelago were ice-locked and traversable only by
motorized' vehicle for seven or eight months of thee year, and
because of its formidable ice and inhospitable climate no established
maritime' route bad ever existed there .
While indicating the greater dangers involved in p 11uting
Arctic waters, and emphasizing that there was no established maritime
thoroughfare through the Arcti the Committee nevertheless argued
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that there should be a right of innocent passage "for ships
all nations through Arctic waters . Such aright is eg;al
	
and
historically associated with territorial rather than internal
watero,(although the Committee did not expressly state this)
and there was perhaps an implication here that some concessions
.should be made to the'larg maritime states which would resist
any curtailment by Canada Arctic waters of what they regarded
as the 'freedom of the seas However, the Committee did emphasize
3that both surface and submarine-0/vessels in the area should be
subject to Canadian regulations .
In emphasizing' the dangers of pollution, the Report
mentioned the sinking in August, 1969, of a Pan Arctic Ltd .-
oil barge which was not specially reinforced for operations in
ice . The barge was being used in connection with company oil
drilling operations on ;Melville Island and it was never' precisely
ascertained where the barge sank . . The Committee recommended that
Pan-Arcticc should rely more on ice-working cargo ships, rather
than on their own transportation facilities . The government should,
addition, undertake a study of marine transportation in the
high Arctic in all its aspects, including a study of " . . .the economic
feasibility of building Canadian cargo ships with special. ca.pacities
for ice manoeuvre and cargo unloading, in the light of the present
availability by charter or otherwise of such ice-breaker cargo
ships sailing under a number of foreign flags ."'?/
30/ In January, 1970, General Dynamics Corporation offered
__
to build sic-175,000 ton submarine tankers for oil
companies with interests
-
in the Prudhoe Day area, see
House of Commons Debates, January 22, 1970, 271.9 .
31/ Pan-Arctic Ltd . is . a consortium finenced-45 per cent
by the Canadian government and owned 70 per cent by
Canadians . The'company .has exploration rights to
44 million of the 70 million acres now . being surveyed
for oil in the Arctic .
economic
In conclusion, Report recommended intensive stu
of pollution dangers he Arctic, including a study of the
physical properties
	
crude oil and other hydrocarbons in
cold waters
"I
persistence in water and under ice ." Such a stud i s
ecological aspects, would focus on the toxic effects of hydro-
csrbotts on plant and animal life in an Arctic environment, and
on methods of controlling oil spills and neutralizing pollt,tanL
The most arresting 'eature of the Report ,.as the
unanimous endorsement by an all-party Committee f an er;phatica?
strong position on Canadian sovereignty over Arctic waters, and
on the need for ,i.rimediate, stringent, unilateral anti-noll .iti on
measures to preclude or to .'combat the pollution menace in the
and their
v
y
mendation that Canada should proclaim its
the archipelagic waters .
In. introducing thelegislation,
The federal governnentts policy a legislation oi
Arctic sovereignty, as enunciated'in .April, 1970,3 represented
position between that of the U.S . State Department, which
desired unrestricted freedom of the seas in the Archipelago, beyond
the historic three-tni .le limit, and the Corns tteet urgent recorn
Affairs and Northern Development said that the two Bills would
promote Canadats four primary interests in the Arctic' as defined
by Prime' Njnister Trudeau : (1) the security of Canada ; (2) the
development of the North ; (3) the preservation of the
See, especially, Houseof Cominnons Debates,
April' 16, 1970, 5937 .
ecological balance ; and (4) the continued high stature
in the international community .
35/
The Arctic anti-pollution legislation- creates a
one-hundred mile wide anti-pollution zone around the circun-
ference of the Archipelago and lays down safety-control zones
within the larger area with varying safety stan6arr- ds-for ships .
The legislation appoints inspectors and imposes fines of up to
$100,000 per . day against owners whose ships ispose'o€ waste
in the prescribed area .
to
acquiescence - n
Although the Act does not purport
assert Canadian sovereignty within archipelap,ic water,
is not inconceivable that, given general ii -nternational
such a unilateral_ assumption of jurisdiction,
eventually Canadian sovereignty might be recognized over . the
whole area . .
In introducing the legislation, Mr . Chretien spoke
of the motives impelling the government to take unilateral action :
35/ Ibid ., loc.cit .
36/ The Arctic Waters Pollution: Prevention Act,
Statutes of Canada, 1970 . Please see map at
Table C opposite illustrating the anti-pollution
limits under the legislation .
Maritime law is evolving, but more slowly
that we would wish in Canada . For centuries emphasis
has been placed, on the right of shipping to the use
of the world's sea lanes without any regard to the
effect this might have on adjacent coastal -.states .
While.-this-may have been practical before, now when
millions of barrels of oil are afloat in tankers on
the high seas on any given day the threat of pollution
is real, and the interest of coastal states, as opposed
to nations which have large commercial fleets, must be
recognized . A state, and particularly those offering
flags of convenience, cannot expect in the world
community to continue these activities without regard
to the interests of other nations .
the Porld Shipping ; Conference in Bru ;ss
last year it
was obvious that these states_contin e
to expect to have absolute priorities for their
partic,:ular requirements
. It became clear to the
povernmcnt of Canada that unilateral
action would ha ,,e
be taken at this time if Canada was to protect its
urne.nt interests . That is why Canada is ; extending its
jurisdiction for pollution control purposes 100 miles
from the co,7.st line in the case of commercial shippin
and more than that, in the case of cone mercial' exploit-
ation
of the continental shelf, where our environ-
ment may be threatened
. It is doing-this-on the
basis of itsright and responsibility to protect the
~anadian environment, both in its seas and on its shores,
from the real threats of pollution .
proclaimed from
to enter a
In
9 70 5939
During
zone
.and
But let . i t be clear . that we stand ready at any time
to cooperate with the world, community in the development
of a regime for the prevention of pollution and the
protection of the environment, particularly along the
coastlines of the world
. Canada, therefore, has decided
to lead the way
14
q-rd to show by example what can and
should be done .
	
-
his remarks, on the detailed, provisions of the legislation, the
Minister emphasized that specific safety control zones would be
time to time by the Governor-in-Council .
safety-control zone a vessel would have to comply with
stipulations concerning its hull structure
; navigational aids ;
qualifications of personnel, and time and route of passage .
certain seasons of the year, or when hazardous ice conditions
prevailed, ships might be forbidden entirely from entering a
Although the thrust of the legislation is preventative rather
than penal, should spillage occur absolute liability exists
37/ House of Commons Debates April 16,
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shipo:•rner cannot escape by tendering evidence that he was not
ne rent . Shipowners may, in fact, be required to show evidence
of financiall responsibility adequate to cover the costs of clean-
and damage horn Pollution .38/
Companion legislation amended the Terr*.torial Ser
and
Zones by extending the territorial sea outwards from three
to twelve miles, thus enabling the government to draw a number
of fisheries closing lines across the mouth of the Gulf of St .
Lawrence, across the Bay of Findy and across Queen Charlotte Sound
on the west coast . As Fisheries Minister Davis explained, such
"fisheries closing lines' are an innovation in
Those of you who followed my announcement
last year about the drawing of baselines on both
our coasts will recall that we drew a series of
straight baselines from headland to headland . We
published maps of Canada's existing sea within
these lines to down along the east coast of Nova
Scotia, for example, and down the west coast or
Vancouver Island. They enclosed literally_
hundreds of bays and inlets. They declared those
bays and inlets not only to be exclusive fishing
zones of Canada but also, because of the nature
of our legislation of 1964, Canadian territory
as well.
Now, we are introducing another concept . It
is the concept of fisheries closing lines . These
closing lines will finally enclose large additional
bodies of water such as the Bay of Fundy, the Gulf'
of St . Lawrence, and Queen Charlotte Sound on the
vest coast .
international law ;
39/ ; S .C . .1964-65, c. 22 ; S .C . 1966-67, .c . 25;
the relevant amendment which alters section 3 k!)
of the original legislation was passed on
June 4, 1970 .
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The idea of fisheries_ closin,; lines
ne i one . It is new to our fisheries in Canada
and itis new tothe international fishery , . .
Baselines in our legislation apply totwo things ;
they, apply to territorial sea as well as to fist,-
i;ng zones of Canada . The fisheries closing lines
concept, on the other hand, applies esci sivel .,
to fishing . It does not necessarily apply to
territory . It applies to the protection of the,
living resources in the fishing waters of, Canada .
It does not apply to transportation, it doess not
apply to shipping as such, it does not apply to
aircraft flying over the zone in question and
it does not apply indeed to submarines passing
.under the surface of the water .
40
.
The Minister added that certain countries with historic or
contractual fishing rights in areas to be closed off by
fisheries closing lines would have to be dealt with on an
individual basis in an effort to phase out such rights over
a period of, years . The Americans and French, especially
longstanding treaty rights enabling their fishermen to fish
have
in Canadian waters . The Treaty of Utrecht of 1713,,conferring
rights on France in Newfoundland waters, had resulted in the
anomaly that French vessels could fish right up to the
Newfoundland shore, whereas domestic legislation forbade
Canadian vessels from doing
The Minister reiterated the Government's position
that there would be a Canadian reservation
to the acceptance of
the compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court in thecase of
the Arctic pollution legislation $ but not to the twelve-mile
territorial limit or fisheries closing-1 ~li es .
House of Commons Debates, April
The American government which had c-pressed vigorous
Canadian soverei , n
the Arctic had been. following development closely. Ii :late
I arch, 1970, l~mr . Sharp told the House of Com m:ons that t ,.e poss-
ibility of such an extension had already been . discussed with
U . Alexis Johnson of the American State Department- during the
latter's visit to Ottawa . earlier that month
. 42/
a .firm statement, the United States government
the legislation introduced both to establish Arctic
zones and a twelve-mile territorial. liar .!)
The bills'seek,to establish pollution
zones in Arctic waters up to 100 miles from every
point of Canadian territory above the 60th parallel .
Within these :cones Canada would assert thetri~-ht to
control all shipping, to prescribe standards o
vessel construction, navigation and operation, and
to prohibit, if Canada deemed it necessary, the
free passage of vessels in those waters.- Additionally,
the legislation '; seeks to author-ze -the establishment
of exclusive Canadian fisheries in the areas of the
high` seas beyond12 miles, such as the Gulf_ of
St. Lawrence and.- the. Bay of Fundy, and a 12-mile
territorial sea off Canada's coasts .
International law provides, no basis for these
proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdiction on
the high seas, and the United`States can neither
accept nor aca-'esce in the assertion of such
~urLsdiction .--
The statement went
	
to express anxiety that . the Canadian
initiatives, unopposed, might set precedents for "other
unilateral infringements ; of the freedom of the seas" in other
parts of the world. It urged- that desirable pollution controls
42/ HouseofCommonsDebates, March 25, ,1970, 54b4 .
43/ House ofCommonsDebates, April 15 1970, 5923
could be brought about
is perhaps the most sweeping reservation made by any member--
state -to the World Court's jurisdiction, the United States is
not in a favourable position : to challenge the appropriateness
of any Canadian reservation on Arctic
	
i/pollution. -I "
The Canadian note reply to the American protest,
which was handed to the United States government on April 1 ,
6,
1970, rejected the assertion. that there eras no basis in inter-
national lairs for the proposed measures . International custo~r!iar
in fact, was an excrescence of state practice, a leading
example of which was the Truman proclamation of 1945 asserting
American jurisdiction over the adjacent continental shelf .
The new Canadian initiatives represented a similar type of
state practice which through time and repetition might become
1
With respect to the 12-mile limit on the
4
territorial sea, we have publicly indicated
our willingness to accept- such limit but
only as part' of an agreed international treaty
also prov .Lct i : i~ for freedom; of passa~pe thro .77h
and over st,_aits Lt5
tie international forum by voluntary
reement and cooperation . In the absence of such a multii teraL
approach, resort could be made voluntarily to the World dour
(even though Canada had,made ,a reservation to the compulsory
risdi.ction of the Court with ference to its Arctic pollution
measure to test the international lec,a.l'valid ty o .both
Arctic pollution zones and the twelve-mile'iimit . 4-(
The statement clarified the American position
unilateral extension of territorial waters :
t might be mentioned that, as the author of what
44/ Ibid., 5923-24.
45/ Ibid ., 5924.
46/ See, e .g ., Larson, "The Facts, the Law, and the
Connally Amendment," n (1961) Duke L .J. 74 .
established as norms of international law . The (nited States
itsel :c, Ioreover, had unilaterally set up exclusive fishi_r
zones in 196 . . The Canadian note proceeded :inductively to
show that a whole series of instances the United States
had assuioed jurisd :i.cti
.on beyond' the three-mile lir,i
	
and
tpr
acti:ce-adhere to the standard which it was
urging Canada to follow. Among other measures beyond
historic three-mile limit the United, States since 1935 had
assumed customs; jurisdiction as far oft sea as 62 mile,
and
. had recently passed analogous pollution control le
;islation
within twelve miles of its coastline
. In cases like the pr.c-
ceding,, both Canada and the United States hid todeter,,~irc -for
themselves hose' best 'to protect their vital interests, inc a ,aa n -
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in particular their national security
.
It is the further view of the Canadian povern-
went that a danger to the environment of
.
.a state
constitutes a' threat to its security
. Thus the
proposed Canadian waters pollution prevention
legislation constitutes -a lawful' ex tension
limited form of jurisdiction to meet parti_crul .ar
dangers, and is of a different order from uni-
lateral interferences with-the freedom of the
high seas such as, forr example, the atomic tests
carried out, by the United States and other states
which, however necessary they may be, have appron-
riated to their own rise vast areas of the high seas
and const-i_tuted rave perils to those who would
wish to utilize such areas during the period of
the test blast . The most recent e,aml?le Of Such
a- test	occurred in October, 1969, when the
United States warned away shipping, within a 50-
mile radius of the est it was conch_ ct-i np;
Amchitka Island . The proposed anti-pollution
legislation, proposed fisheries protection legi
.
lation and the proposed 12-mile territor-i.al
sea
consV ute a thr at to no state and a peril to no
one .
47/ .louse Commons Debates, April 1970, 602_7 .
48/ Ibic 6027 .
%iiord "security in its m,!idest sense
When the c; igencies of national security so
	
ctate,. in other
words, state may take measures proport onate to the danger
ensure that its environment is protected . It would - D, e
try t in this context the Canadian government was using the
there was a vital
national interest preserving- environment ai.nce life'
1L elf, all human operations, could be : endangered ould
toxic_ reach
of the effects pollution in the Arctic, and the i ° : diacy
M the danger, Canada could not await_ a multilateral con-
vention on pollution .
While reaff i_rf ..in , the need ediate unilateral
a.cti_on, e note repeated the overnmen't s wwwi liinRness to
colt borate with other states in reaching hir,,her standards o
navi ation safety and environmental protection .
In the note, , the Canadian government draws
the ;hl.y important ciisti'ncti.on between ji risdi.ct9.on --and
sovereignty . With :in, its boundaries, a state . may either
choose or refrain frog:-choosing to exercise jurisdiction ;
nevertheless, in political terms, it is sovereign of the whole
area . Although this di.st .inctior: wDs not explicitly made in,
the note, it is certain imriplic - in passages like the
following
With res :act to the waters the Arctic
Archipelago, the position of Canada has always
been that these waters are regarded - as Canadian .
'.Thil.e Canada wou):d be pleased to discuss with
other states international standards of .navii
a.tion safety and environmental protection to
be applicable to the waters of the Arctic, the
Canadian povernrient cannot accept ,lny s';rgestaon 43
th_it: Ganadian'VIaters sho •.A.Lu be
the s . ;nc~ion between jurisdiction and sver c :Hntjr
c validly cir .^ it -,,Tould lend a certain ca'tie once to,
:ccessive Sovernment statements cla:ir:,
	
,ver igntj'` ov'"r
5 {~ f
ctic T aters ;- Canada,
might
be sover ,~, ,_nc whole
rcii . :,ela choose merely le-islate -L-or
For such a statement. sees e . a , Pxternal Affairs
Minister Sharp's detailed ren}r1 3 or, A, c t3. c
sovereignty in the Toronto, G7.c;be
September 18, 1969, 7 .
CHAPTER FIVE . .
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
0- the two major problems examined
	
the for
pages, sug sted that the international. legal au- of
the eaters the Arctic Archipelago less settl
Despite_ poradic and short-lived
threats to Canadian sovereignty over the :islands, there has
never been an official claim by another state which placed
Canadian ownership of them in doubt . e threats to Canad i
title in the past have arisen from a feared clandestine
"occupation" of the Archipelago adjacent to Greenland by
Denmark, from P orwe«ian
explorationin
the same area,
a subtle process of "americanizations
land which ,,ould have made it difficu
sovereignty over the Archipelago .
the ownership of the islands .
inning hmerican: military
Vide supra 52-58 .
over the northern main-
than is
r Canada to exercise
Menacing as these dangers appeared time, their
enduring effects were inconsequential . If one considers the
entire century ollowing confederation, he single persistent
claim, effectuated, at least in the last five decades, by a
contin' :ous display of governmental acts, has been the Canadian
c laim. i t should be noted, this connection, that the cont-
presence-in the North would have been
impossible without prior Canadian consent, d its comparable
to the Canadian presence in Colorado, which a feature of the
same NORAD defence system .
THE PRESCRIPTION AND CONSOLIDATION DOCTRINES
If one applies either the test of "effective occupation"
developed in international jurisprudence early in this cent-,Yry,2 /
or the revised version of the test known as the "consolidation"
doctrine ,,/ Canadia.n sovereignty over the archipelagic
islands is
equally confirmed . Under the forriier doctrine, discovery and
e<:ploration predominantly by British explorers given rise to
an inchoate title, perfected bylorng tanding, unopposed occupation
and administration of ;the-islands . Under the latter doctrine,
one may invoke essentially . the same governmental acts
to sati fy
its somewhat, different requirements,' except . that the passage of
time will not be regarded as the important element it constitutes
in prescription.
Consolidation has been expounded with different nuances
by various authorities, e .g . de-Visscher, Jennings, Johnson
.end
Auburn. They all build upon, however, the seminal decision of
Judge de Visseher in the NorwegianFisheries,,case,
which-seems .
to have propmted aa critical reexamination of Huber's Award in the
Palmas case, the locus'classicus of the doctrine of effective
2/
	
Videsupra 42-51 .
3/ See, e .g ., Jennings,
The Acquisition of Territory,
in International Law, Manchester, 1963, 23-35
(cited hereinafter as Jennin.ns) ; de Visscher,
Theoryand Reality in PublicInternational Law,
(tr. Corbett), Princeton, 1959, 200-203 ; Johnson,
"Consolidation as a Root of Title in International
Law," (1955) Camb. L.J . 215, and Auburn,
"The i-thj.te
Desert, in, (1970) 19 I.G .L.Q ., 229 at 231-237 .
occupation . T e relevant ,art
	
de Visscber i,
as follows
Norway has been in a position to lie
wit-bout -any contradiction that neither the
pro .r 1 ,ai:ion of her delimitation Decrees in
l`369 and in 1889,' nor their application, gave
rise to any opposition on tine part of Porei n
States . Since, moreover, these decrees const-
itute, as has been shown above, the application
of a well-defined and uniform system, .t is
indeedd this system itself which should reap
the benefit of general' toleration, the basis
of an historical consolidation which would rlahe
it enforceable against all States . .
.tt 1
As Jennings observes, 5~the substitution "consolid-
ation" for "prescription" is not merely a terminolo,;ical reform .
When making good a "prescriptive" title in sputed case, a
claimant state endeavours to cite a large body of evidence
its own favour, as was done in the Palmas, Cl or
.erto Island
and EasternGreenland cases . Suchh evidence may shoos that the
claimant, to the knowledge of rival claimant e
;ercised iin-
disputed authority' over the contentious territory for a
prolonged period of time . Evidence will be adduced concerning
the operative extent of goverrunental .acts, the character of the
acts performed,, the acquiescence therein and submission
thereto
of other states, the intervals between , the acts and so on. if
such evidence suffices, its cumulative effect will be to confer
"prescriptive' , title ipon :the claimant„ The consolidation
doctrine differs, according to Jennings that official. acts
similar to those invoked to establish : rescription" re u .used
not merely as evidence of title, but as " . .`.decisive ingredients
creating title."
	
In using the prescriptive
test to demonstrate effective occupancy, there
e:npha on the effluxion of time ; sufficient time must have
elapsed to allow the state to manifest anumus- dorninendi over
the disputed territory by positive acts, and perhaps to show
that the international community or the chief actors in it
,
affected by claimant's title, have acquiesced in it . In
demanding such evidence of . animus and acquiescence over a
sufficient period of time, critics of the prescriptive theory
charge that ''t unduly stresses the private law analogy of the
acquisition of prescriptive title to land which is known in
North America as "squatter4s rights.". And the private law
analogies breakndow , of course, because human individual's
and state entities or the human community and the international
are' not identical .
,By certain affirmative acts a state - might' so treat
certain lands or waters that, without a prolonged passage of
time, it effectively reduced them . to its possession. User
of territory alone, involving official acts like those invoked
to show prescriptive title, might "in themselves have the effect
of attaching'a territory or an . expanse of sea to a given Stat
in de Visscher's words .
7/
Once given the indispensable fact of
possesion,. the "interests" and "relations" of the claimant state .
constitute "consolidating factors" of snore significance
community
may
a avy
than the effluxion .of time'as under the prescriptive theory
based on private law analogies . Jessup has criticized the
6/ . Jennings, 25.
7/ As quoted in Jennings 25 .
nter-temporal" aspects f the prescriptive _Lest in Lie P.3lrnas
case on the ground that
	
leads to indefiniteness . One
cannot say with absolute certainty_' who has title to disputed
territory in case of controversy . Judge Huber asked .not only
that title be acquired, for instance by discovery, but that
maintained accordin to the evolving norms of international
a . Jessup_indicated that, given such a-test, there could
never confident assurance of a putative owner's title.
By failing to satisfy novel regiiirements of developing inter-
national l w, title could he extinguished at' any moment .
De
examining its title
constantly b
to each portion
Employing such test, "Every state would
under the necessity of
9If its territory . ,
Consolidation, the other hand as Auburn indicates,
IN
-
while eliminating_ the undesirable consequences -s of the inter-
temporal law, would tend to encourage ;dub1ous claims'. The
example he gives is of the -"consolidation" through energetic
Soviet participation in Antarctic research of a claim arising
from the Russian "sighting" of the Antarctic coast in . the early
nineteenth century .?l ' Any basis of ''possession" would . serve'
as a basis for a claim through "consolidation,' if temporal
factors were of minimal al importance.
Jessup, "The Palmas. Island Arbitration
(1928) 22 A.J .I.L. 735 .
Ibid., 740,
10/ Auburn, op .cit.
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Johnson contends that by employing fresh concept
consolidation" the older law ray be reformulated on a ~~ .cre
s tisfactory basis :
It is submitted that the process of "maintainin g;
or :"rnan fast-,-ng" a title, to which reference has just
been made, is in essence a process of "consolidation
different in degree perhaps, though certainly not in
kind, iron the "consolidation" by which a title may
sornetir:es be acquired in the first place . ' If this
sib ,:,_issi .on be true, it may be 'possible y ef,ploy ng
the notion of "consolidation" to present the law
relating to title to territory on i new basis., Such
a. basis would stress the close relat-',on between the
acquisition and the :maintenance of titles
'
. It wo}ild
avoid the ambiguities
surrounding
the present doctrine
of acquisitive
prescription
.12/
In other words,
	
e subsumed under the gener c term
onsolidation the ostensibly different modes of acquirii
territory discussed by 1-1s_sber in the Palmas case, and by de Visscher
in the Norwegian Fisheries case .- The acquisition of title would,
however, in either case be seen through the urism of "consolidation
rather than th t "prescri-ption" . From s'.'ch a vantage point,
"prescription
s asive eno create nsoli ate'! ; title more quickly.
The speculation that the purported conveyance of the
archipelagic slands by Britain to Canada through the grants, and
the reason for any ambiguities therein, are irrelevant . ecially
if one regards the last fifty years there a remarkably trong
merely the acquisition of title through "consol-
idation" over a some hat longer period of time, resu eal?1 ~- because
the interests' and relations of the claimant
l / Johnson cit supra, 22.5 .
1 / Vide supra, 10 f
ate are not ~~er-
body evidence manifesting a virtually unopposed Canadian
intention to exercise, sovereignty over the ;archipelago.=- /
'here have, of course ;, been certain international incidents
which could have developed, conceivably, into adverse claims
by foreign powers to parts of the Archipelago .
serious claii.,s developed, and that the incidents mentioned
were brief and non-recurring may have arisen from a calculation
on the ;.part of the powers concerned that any such claims
be legally fitile .
The extension of police, 'rescue,,navigation_and
other services to the Archipelago, its exploration, admin-
=istration and preparations by Canada for its . defence, along
with the, application of game laws and a host of other domestic
measures to it over a prolonged period of time could surely
satisfy the prescriptive test of title . And,
	
one prefers
what some jurists consider. the amplified and corrected test
represented by the "consolidation" doctrine, and equally good
made out for Canadian sovereignty . It should becase could' be
stressed that in invoking either of the foregoing tests, it is
the fact-of.' pos session which is . of primary importance, rather
than any documentary chain of title establishing: s-.!ccession .'
Any defects in, the British Orders-in-Council of 1.87
.0
and 1880
would recede into insignificance in the face of the .T.incha l.ended
possession by Canada of the Arctic stands in the ensuing years .
The Orders min-Council, at most, would constitute an alteration
of ownership as between the United Kingdom and Canada, They
are useful as evidencing a renunciation of title in the area in
Canadn's fnvotir, but they still would not establish conclusively
1 / Vide s7-pra, chapter three, passim .
the islands in intern<atlnal law. Such
on undisputed, longstanding possession, along
one prerers th
at intention to exercise sovereignty and official acts
eying' such an intention with the acquiescence of the inter-
national comet nity .
positive acts of state will
	
relied biut the passage of
Lire will be minimized and Canadian "interests." and P 1relations"
in the Archipelago will be emphasized .
consolidation" formula, the same
It can hardly be disputed
that Canadian economic, :political and military interested
in the
area are paramount and have been so for some time . In its . relations
to the rest of the world, Canada has consistently held
; itself o~. t
the }proprietor of the Archipelago, and the defence of Cana
.da's
sovereign has long' taxed Canadian officials . 15~ One of the
exceptions this generalizations, and n exception conspicuous
because of its rarity, was the Canadian disinclination to make
sovereignty over the Archipelago an issue in the recent
concernin ; the possible inauguration of diplomatic relations with,
Coinrrinist China. In this case, of course, the Canadian attitude
was conditioned' by a reluctance to recognize officially Peking's
sovereignty over Taiwan. It might have been considered, copse=
c ;, :ently, that the raising of the territorial. sovereignty issue
in one case would lead to its emergence in the other, and tie
stalemate of negotiations .
establishing the validity of the Canadian claim under
the consolidation doctrine one need
not go back' more than a' few
years . e are not dealing here with geographically remote entities
e Palmas or Clipperton
	
ands, L with a formation which
is a nat,iral geographical a.ppi,rtenance to the Canadian main-
land . Canadian interests the area have been recognized
by other stater, .and official acts, havin .y:y, regard to local
circumstances, have adequately manifested or "consol ids ted"
Canadian sovereignty . In some respects, indeed, the consol
c.d.ation doctrine' is even rrorc >ropitioi,s for Canada. than is
the prescriptive one . If one recalls that de Visscher originally
elaborated the former doctrine in connection with the Norwegian
claim to a relatively extensive ; :fisheries zone,l(' / the consolid-
ation'doctri:ne could be used to support both the insular and
acquuatic claims : now made by the Canadian' government.' One can
draw, in this connection, certain analogy bet aeen the Norwegian
cases
fisheries'' zone and the Canadian anti'-pollution zone .
the
an extended zone was unilaterally procalimed to advance
predominantly economic interests . It is true that the Canadian
,claim is not one with a long historic l foundation, as, was
Nori .^egian .one, . but time not of the essence under the consolld
ation doctrine . In addition, Canada can aver that her anti-
pollution zone represents a benefit to the whole Northern Hemis-
phere . Since many of the ocean currents_ of this Hemisphere
originate in the Arctic,
l
ution occurring in Canad
persed over wide areas of
16/ Videsupra, 127-128.
17/ See Baird, Chapter five .
there is a very real danger that poll
an arctic waters would rapidly be dis-
the world . Although there is a measure
135 -
self-interest In the Canadian initiative, Canada can reason-
ably contend that in creating an anti-pollution zone
acting in a fiduciary capacity for other states'.
11 THE D VELOPMENT OF NEW LEGAI lv0P
The twentieth century has been- .an era of innovation
ternational law. The evolution of cont nous fish n,-, zones
and maritime belts serving a wide variety of purposes has been,
one of the most pronounced characteristics of recent decades .
President:, Truman's unilateral claim to proprietary
	
ghts in the .
Continental.Shel.f' has already been mentioned .-
subsequent subsequent claims by other states have given rise . -Lo what was
fast becoming a customary right, at least tosubjacent mineral
resources, in the Shelf . The American President°;s 1945 pron-
ounconent, along with simi.la.r .claims'by other states, led to the
Geneva Conventiononthe Continental Shelf, 1958 embodyi wl~ t
was initially an individual claim .as a general doctrine
international law . If such claim, based on individual econori:-, .c
advantages, is admissible, how much none persuasive is c
which advances not merely one stat.ets personal advantages, but
those of a large number of other states who would suffer in cot on
the consequences of Arctic pollution? The strength of the Canadian
'Position in creating an anti-poll-ution belt is that in doing so
it is promoting. the interests of the 7orld comrr .tnit, i the
.of effective legal controls, to prevent international n,.,>s nce .
serace
In
i t w,culd be
pollution
a
1.36
the light of the durability of pollutants in northern . waters, 1!
dangerous and retrograde step if the new h .indred-i ; ; .le
cone were to e abolished .
It is understandable, accordingly, that Canada should .
make a .reservation to the compulsory jurisdiction of the World
Court in connection with the establishment of the zone . The
large role that political policy plays in some decisions, and
the influence of what might be described as the judges representing,
western shipowning nations was apparent in the latest mouth-West
Africanc~. e , 2~~ where European judges. voted en bloc against Liberia
and Ethiopia . To subject the future environmental purity of
northern s--ra.ter.s to possible adverse political 'decision by,the
World. Court was a risk that Canada could not take. It . was in-
fort-.;nate that a Canadian reservation had to be _made . Given,
however,, the lacunae in present international law, the extended
period that would be needed before an international agreement on the
matter could be reached, and the imperative and instant need
prevent the pollution of hemispheric waters, there
a. hazard which the
recent years has dramatized. To advocate protracted . international
conferences or other dilatory procedures is really a refusal to
19/ Vide supra, 109.
20.1 I .C .J . Reports, 1966.
d*d not seem
to be any suitable alternative . With the increasing internation:al-
and concern over this problem, it is very- possible' that
such anti-pollution_measn~ .res will become a widespread and accepted
practice in the next few years .
Initiatives like the Canadian anti-pollution zone are
difficult to argue against cogently . They are contrived not -to
farther a purely se fish national interest, butto g,,'rd against
awareness
increasing number of tanker oil spillages in
confront the i:-,nedi cy of the problem . To take decisive action
on a unilateral basis, however,, also presents problems . In acting;
as it 1 s done snada has implicitly placed the priority of co-r-
britting poill't--Lon above that of unhampered navi,,yition and this is
bound to offend sore of the treat shipping nations of the world .
For a small or "middle" power like , nada to take such
a novel initiative in an area where the short
	
interests
ritiine powers will be adversely affected is risky .
Canadian e,:ternal'relations have traditionally been. depicted
a "triangle" in which, the extent of. its ability, Oanada
has attempted to maintain a degree of .independ'ence by creatively
eyploitinp the tensions existing between the . United States and
of major
"balance" might be achieved, for example,
throuu the attempted substitution of a policy' of Empire
Common~,wealth free' trade for one of economic, continental isin,
integration of the North American econory now makes si.ich moves
d ;i.ffic,~IL, but formerly even the judicious suggestion of
of markets might accomplish the abandonment of an undesirable
policy one of the larger powers against which it was directed.
It is probable that, if the new Canadian : initiatives
on the law of the sea are to be successful, a balancing of
interests through adroit diplomacy will be necessary.
unlikely, however that Canada . could achieve anything tangible
by economic realignments or pressures . From a realistic , erspecti.ve,
the states it would be contendin against are simply too powerful
economically, and themselves possess such resources for economic
manoeovre as to be almost unaffected by any Canadian pressures .
The arrest of an American tanker in the new anti-poll>>tion zone
7ainht be followed by the retaliatory raising of tariffs on Calad .,"
primary prodicts normally marketed in the United' States . Or, in
similar circumstances the Soviets might decide to buy stra.lian
rather na.n Canadian wheat .
	
is highly doubtful whether,
siderin-: relative power of the probable adversaries
economic retaliation after such incidents would have a, or
impact either the United States or the Soviet Union
.
Rat?per than the threat of econo, :w:i_c sanctions,
t''-:al advantages inhering in the Canadian ini
ives would be preferable . ,'here The p,rity of hemispheric
is i_n_jeopardy s rely is in the interest of all
states in
northern latit cooperate in the Canadian measures,
stressing,
taken,
hosti
for Canada to coopera a in any reciprocal measures undertaken
by other states . The rge puncture in +he'hull of the S .S .
Manhattan during its initial voyage, despite all the precautions .
iciently emphasizes the danger .
also advantageous, at least at this stage of
navigational progress, for the major maritime nations to be able
to rely Canadian navigational, expertise and the assi ance
Canadian :;,eteorological and icebreaking services in negotiat e
services,
for a reasonable fee, .l.l vesse's meeting minimum safety` .
standards e )epartment of Transport, sho-ld'be an induce-
rent to other states, to comply with' the Canadian regulations .
In contrast h Soviet policy it is not the policy-of the
Canadian governr,~ent to exclude vessels from its arctic
erely to ensure safe passage .
Canada might also indicate, a mutuality of le2a.i. interest
in its maritime claims both to the United States and to the Soviet
Union. It is true that the initial United States-reaction to the
of
sa ;e . The provision by ,a nada of sue
a twelve-mile belt of territorial waters was
.eaters,
but a .sober reconsideration
of the issue-might - persuuade
the Americans of the reasonableness of the Canadian legislation.
The United States a for some time been striving
to have Latin American nations limit their clams to off-
shore eaters to twelve miles ; some states, such as hers
Chile and Brazil, not, claimi, a strip
	
territorial waters
911
200-nniles Jn Breadth .--. The imericans, however, emphasize-
that any toner 1 extension ~lve-mile limit should be
coupled -with a m ltilater convention guaranteeing
:Oass .. c thro . -h narrow stra
',which
~ ouid other fi se be -~lasc-
ified as inte=il 'waters, h Canadian - closing, of she Archi-
pelago tc:ro i the creation of a t% relve-n.i.ie belt while pres-
erving rights of innocent passage for foreign vessels Meets
hot h criteria set by the United States . Given ;s multilateral
conventio , ~ would be hard to comprehend ho the United States
could object to the legislation. The Canadian action wo-0.1d be
infinitely preferable to the closing
.
of the Archipelago by
em of straight baselines, along with a claim to all. t
waters enclosed as "internal" (as was case with the
Philippines and Indonesia)) . ?--
1
In addition to meeting the two chief conditions laid
dot:vn the United States for the extension of territorial waters,
Canada can appeal a mutuality of defence interests with : its
theNATO ally . It can suggest that, as country, which can most
persuasively substantiate its claim to the islands and waters
the Archipelago it deserves American support- n i s maritime
claims because of common defence interests . . Shoudl the area come
under the control
2 / Vide supra, fn.3 at 101 .
Videsupra, 23-2G.
an unfriendly power, the strategiv consequences
would be most unpalatable to both the United States and C anada .
In this connection, and related to the extent of a
possible Canadian', claim there is no necessary incompati_b-i.l-ity
between the new Canadian claims and the sector claim which
Canada eni, .nciated' in l925 .- The new claims merely extend
existing territorial waters and . create an anti-poll'ztion zone ;
they do not relate to title ; to islands or polarice which a
sector claim would erm:brace . Accordingly, the new claims
combined with possible title to polar 'iice within the Canadian
rrsector" would be strategically invaluable . In an atmosphere
of
international defence the above considerations may lose
force, but in the present condition of
international society they are still highly relevant.
In the case off ,the Soviet Union, there is an analo}y
2
between the respective "sector"'claims ; of Canada and the Soviets,---
'4l
and as- the chief Arctic nations such claims . would be nut ; .ally
supporting. Itt might even be suggested that as sovereigns of
most of the . coastline of the Arctic the two co7'ntr -es .co'.dld be
major participants in establishing a regional: regir- ie of i_'nter-national
law applicable to Arctic waters. Stich a rerim . .e t%,o ;. lld be pred .i:ca::ted
on the consideration that Arctic waters have nique characteristics
and present extraordinarily difficult navigational problems ; a
regime'
su.` generis of a' regional character
required governing the use s ch waters. If certain purported
universal vali.!es of international law could not be adapted to
Arctic conditions, a regional regime reflecting more appropriate
values,
such as the "sector" doctrine and seasonal claims to icc,
23/. Vide supra,
31 . : .
24/ Vide supra, 36-40
L h
nev, norms of international law to meet the. exigencies of the
pollution crisis, Canada's recent initiatives ,ill be : nder-
stood syr:lpathetically by other states and will contribute,
along with similar initiatives by others, to the progressive
developi, ent of international law .
The conservatism of legal. systems dictates at tir,}es
that novel departures irmits be made to solve urgent problems .
not resolvable by existing
law. The' development of customary'
law frog; a repetition of isolated practices : and :sages, after
a trial period, may be rejected, by the-community and never
attain the status 'of . laws . Other practices after
	
eriod
in which their positive characteristics are, observed and approved,
,;light be substituted for broader values more . ger;erally applicable .
In its diplomatic activities following its claims
Canada should seek to impress upon other nations broad cornmon
areas
f interest like some of those indicated above . A recip-
rocity advantages might lead to the wider sanctioning of
the Canadian initiatives and, eventually, to, the development
of new norms of international law .
Two important drawbacks to Canada's claims, perhaps,
are (a) the novelty of the extensive anti--pollution zone in
international law, and (b) Canada's refusal to accept the coi-;,-
pulsory jurisdiction of the World Court in connection with its
anti-pollution zone . While these handicaps are _i.mpedirnients of
serious nature to'the'full ;acceptability .of''the Canadian
claims, the alternatives, as mentioned- above,, are so repugnant
.that the action taken appears to be the lesser evil .
to be hoped that with the dynamic evolution' of
battin .pollution ray
other states
O L1 •_,tion
sanctioned c the com;!;unitv ana
: :_ensure regulating the law
	
ie sea in the interest corn--
likened to an incipient international
custo , If such a m.eaauresi_s judiciously fra .,ld and is'effect-
ive and beneficiall in practice, when sanctioned and emulated
adually assumes the st Lus of International
!.sto : ary it be suggested that the ~,anadian anU-
lation described above falls into suck
category . In view of the international benefits which presuu,-
ab iy will accrue from it, the prospects appear quite ; good tha L
through tine it will be generally endorsed.
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